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The Challenge of Nonterritorial and Virtual Conflicts

Sloan

The Challenge of Nonterritorial and Virtual Conflicts: Rethinking Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism



Stephen Sloan
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On the cover.

The image portrays a terrorist in a three-dimensional format. It represents the ability of a new generation of terrorists to use the Internet as a means of creating highly realistic computer-generated images or to stage real threats and acts of terrorism. The concept of virtual conflict has become a reality. Used with permission from the artist Thomas Warming; he is a Danish freelance illustrator of Sci-Fi and Fantasy, Matte Painting.



*The Challenge of
Nonterritorial and Virtual
Conflicts: Rethinking
Counterinsurgency and
Counterterrorism*

Stephen Sloan

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Foreword

In this paper, esteemed terrorism expert Dr. Stephen Sloan provides a learned narrative about the scholarship and doctrine concerning terrorism and insurgency. In offering his thoughts about the well chronicled flow of terrorism analysis, he identifies how recent trends should be affecting counterterrorism doctrine and policy. In the concluding chapters he provides his views for improving upon the traditional approaches in order to deal with international and virtual threats.


The premise of Dr. Sloan's paper is that terrorism in the 21st century has become predominately international in nature, riding on the back of opportunities provided by new technologies in cyberspace, aerospace, and the Internet. He suggests that traditional concepts for countering terrorism and insurgency are not effective in dealing with contemporary terrorism in its modern form as a nonterritorially based insurgency. Concerning the notion of a global insurgency, Dr. Sloan's analysis runs parallel with scholars such as Rohan Gunaratna, Richard Shultz, and David Kilcullen whose recent writings address the issues of terrorism and global insurgency.

The reader can decide upon the extent of the global insurgency — or if one exists at all. And is global insurgency the right descriptor for the terrorism phenomenon we now observe? Dr. Sloan's paper enjoins the reader to consider the observed facts of an increasingly effective use of technology by groups that employ the terrorism tool to advance their interests. The intent of these terrorist groups will be up to the intelligence community and policymakers to discern. But Dr. Sloan suggests, while we must acknowledge the imperatives of countering global insurgency, U. S. counterterrorism policy should be keenly focused upon countermeasures for terrorist's use of aerospace and cyberspace.

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D.
Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department

About the Author

Dr. Stephen Sloan is the Lawrence J. Chastang Distinguished Professor of Terrorism Studies, Office of Global Perspectives, University of Central Florida and Professor Emeritus, University of Oklahoma. He also serves as a senior fellow with the JSOU Strategic Studies Department and is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He completed a Ph.D. and M.A. in Comparative Politics at New York University in New York City and B.A. at Washington Square College of New York University.



Professor Sloan was initially trained as a political scientist with a Southeast Asian area specialty. He was also a Fulbright Professor at Tribhuvan University in Nepal. Professor Sloan's first book, *A Study in Political Violence: the Indonesian Experience* (Rand McNally, 1971), is based on his field research in the Republic where as a result of an attempted coup, over 500,000 people were killed. His interest in the political violence of insurgency dates from that time.

In the 1970s Dr. Sloan engaged in pioneering studies of international terrorism and taught what was most likely the first course on that topic at the university level in the United States. He also pioneered the development of full-scale simulations of terrorism incidents, which he conducted for military and police forces domestically and overseas. He was involved in training U.S. forces in peacekeeping in preparation for their deployment to Kosovo. In addition he has led and participated in workshops for state and local police forces on counterterrorism and crisis management. His latest book, coauthored with Robert Bunker, is *Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training* (University of Oklahoma Press, 2011). He is the author or coauthor of numerous other books (and articles), including *Historical Dictionary of Terrorism* with Sean Anderson (The Scarecrow Press, 1994) now in its Third Edition (2009), *Terrorism: the Present Threat in Context* (Berg Publishers, 2006), *Terrorism: Assassins to Zealots* with Sean Anderson (The Scarecrow

Press, 2002), *Corporate Aviation Security* with Harry Pizer (University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), and *Beating International Terrorism* (Air University Press, 1986) and Revised Edition (2000).

Professor Sloan was a senior fellow at the Air University, Center for Aerospace Doctrine Research and Education where his research dealt with terrorism and low-intensity conflict. He also headed a counterterrorism practice for a large consulting firm in Washington, D.C. where he worked with the intelligence community. Dr. Sloan was a member of the faculty for the first iteration of the Program on Terrorism and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies Center. He was also on the Steering Committee that established the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism and became its first senior fellow.

The Challenge of Nonterritorial and Virtual Conflicts: Rethinking Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism

1. Introduction

The nature of warfare and physical conflict in their many forms has been subject to profound historical and contemporary pressures. The continuity and change created by these pressures will continue to challenge those who seek to understand and those who will be responsible for fighting in increasingly highly technical battlefields. These are battlefields where traditional animosities fed by religious, ethnic, and other *primordial* conflicts take place, where the weapons of choice are the gun and the bomb. These are also conflicts where highly sophisticated military organizations face determined adversaries who use simple organization and the potency of beliefs to engage in asymmetric conflicts. These are places where modern technology, planning, and organization can be a liability.

The changing conflict environment has an impact beyond the transformation of warfare. It is a transformation that does not readily fit the traditional spectrum of nuclear, conventional, and unconventional warfare. It is recognized that the transformation is underway, and it is crucial to address what the transformation means. We must look beyond today's conflicts, seek understanding, and take the initiative toward addressing recurring and new threats to our security. There are certainly important lessons to be learned from crucibles of the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other areas where an amalgamation of organized and unorganized violence and

warfare have occurred. But it is also an appropriate time to anticipate and initiate the necessary changes in doctrine, strategy, and policies to effectively meet new challenges by those who must prevent or fight terrorism in a new conflict environment.

This monograph focuses on the continuity and change of a particular type of conflict, one that has deep historical roots, but at the same time may be morphing into a new form of warfare. While the focus is on contemporary and future developments, the analysis is also based on a long-term commitment to research for understanding the causes, dynamics, and outcomes of political violence, warfare and terrorism, and insurgency. A number of the citations will manifest that long-term commitment, while others will focus on the current understanding as well as the future direction of global insurgency and terrorism. It is a study of the continuing evolution of insurgency, an evolution that may not be fully recognized even by those who both understand and have mastered the traditional approaches to initiating and countering the irregular wars: the small wars, the wars in the shadows, dark wars, and guerrilla warfare that seek to differentiate from a conventional conflict.

A new generation of specialists in the field have developed doctrines and strategies to deal with recent and ongoing country and regional strife. A number of specialists have insightfully addressed the current and future changing nature of insurgency or terrorism. But even these innovators may have, to a degree, been tied to past assumptions regarding the nature of both insurgency and terrorism. This study therefore seeks to intellectually help push the envelope in addressing what can rightfully be called both the *transformation of insurgency* and the directly related *transformation of terrorism*. The goal of this study is to continue the important reevaluation of the nature of insurgency and terrorism that is now taking place in the class and seminar rooms at military and civilian universities, but also ultimately on the battlefields and cyberspace. The objective of this study is to help promote the necessary debate among those in the United States and other countries who are or will be responsible for protecting their countries' security against enemies who are redefining armed conflict in their own right.

Chapter 2 (Globalization and the Expansion and Contraction of Community) provides an overview of the profound changes in a far from coherent international arena. It addresses the impact of globalization, particularly

in reference to the contradictory pressures caused by the rapidly growing technological development and dissemination of goods, services, and values to an interdependent global audience. The chapter addresses the gradual erosion of the nation-state system and the emergence of nonstate actors in the international arena ranging from multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and a wide variety of domestic and transnational groups.

Chapter 3 (The Changing Conflict Environment) relates the impact of the developments in the second chapter to the changes in the nature and characteristics of contemporary and future armed conflict. Contemporary militaries will continue to engage in conventional, local, and regional conflicts using modern weapons and communications; however, the conflict environment is changing.

Chapter 4 (Continuity, the Traditional Elements) addresses the major characteristics of traditional insurgencies ranging from its strategy, the primacy of politics, and its protracted nature. The chapter then discusses the basic elements that have been traditionally developed to formulate and operationalize counterinsurgency programs.

Chapter 5 (From Battlefield to Cyberspace) outlines the new characteristics of global insurgency. The focus is on the impact of technology that has enabled insurgents to conduct operations and campaigns in a global field of operations. The combination of territorially based, nonterritorially based, and cyberspace warfare is discussed within the context of unique and growing challenges to governments and organizations that seek to counter a new form of insurgency.

Chapter 6 (Terrorism in the Era of Global Insurgency) discusses the differences between the nature of terrorism as a tactic in a traditional insurgency and its transformation into what can be called a proto-strategy in the formulation and execution of global insurgencies. An understanding of transformation will lead to addressing how we develop the interpretation of different religious beliefs and ideologies. Such value-driven approaches are changing the nature, intents, and capabilities of a new generation of terrorists.

Chapter 7 (Future Trends in Global Insurgency and Terrorism) assesses future trends as an aspect of the changing nature of armed conflict and the continuing profound transformation of international affairs. The assessment

is mid and long term in scope and provides a broad overview that could assist policymakers in taking the initiative in response to changes in the conflict environment. The chapter provides a foundation to address strategic choices that should be considered in meeting an enduring and ever-changing threat.

Chapter 8 (Countering Global Insurgency, New Challenges and Approaches) integrates and summarizes the analysis in the preceding chapters to address the crucial questions associated with the formulation and execution of policies to meet the challenges created by global insurgency and global terrorism. The chapter does not solely address United States policies, but the crucial relationship between those policies and other governments and organizations that should be considered.

Chapter 9 (The Dimensions of Policy, the Challenge Continues) references the analysis in the body of the work to summarize policy guidance that can provide a basis for addressing the challenges of countering global insurgency and terrorism.

2. Globalization and the Expansion and Contraction of Community

When the atomic bomb detonated over Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, the world entered a new age. It was borne of the realization that the capability for mass violence and warfare had developed to the point where the potentiality for global destruction became a reality. The face of international politics and warfare were profoundly altered as we entered the nuclear age.

We have now entered a new age that is yet to be defined. One cannot clearly state when it began. The evolution of this age on one hand was outwardly gradual but has accelerated to a degree that we are still to understand, much less predictable. Even futurist J. Arthur C. Clark and his colleagues probably might have been shocked.¹ This new age is the result of a number of factors, some of which are recognizable and some of which are yet to be discerned.

Perhaps the most important factor in promoting the change is the process of globalization. The word *process* is used with great reservation. Process implies discernible actions that are often interdependent and lead to some predictable outcomes. Perhaps it would be better to use the words *global happenings*, since the magnitude of what is occurring is still not clear and the results are open to interpretation.

However defined, globalization is perhaps one of the major reasons for what appears to be a contradictory trend in the international area. We are witnessing a growing technocratic and interdependent world where geographic, political, economic, and social boundaries are increasingly losing their identity and significance. In reaction, members of vari-

...geographic, political, economic, and social boundaries are increasingly losing their identity and significance.

ous groups have acted against the forces of globalization. Examples are an extended family, a clan, a tribe, an ethnicity, a particular religion, or a combination of these social and value constructs. For such groups, globalization is sometimes viewed to be a moral, religious, and political evil, which is the product of Western colonialism and imperialism, primarily secular in nature and driven by materialism. Moreover the values associated with globalization and modernizations are seen as a threat to all facets of traditional social

orders. In effect we see the reassertion of different communities who seek to maintain or create what they believe to be their unique place in the temporal and a transcendental world.

This expansion and contraction is complicated by two additional factors:

- a. In the name of religion various traditional, real, and imagined communities are not contracting in the face of globalization.² These communities may often be perceived to be not only part of their parochial community but also a universal one, since the scope of their activities seeks to expand the community far beyond a particular state or geographic region. They seek a far broader transformation of the international order in the name of their traditional values.
- b. These traditionalists, while rejecting the attitudes often associated with technological modernization, are more than willing to use and engage in innovation with the very technology they abhor in order to achieve their goals. Whether it is modern weapon systems or the sophisticated communication, the traditionalists are not going to reject the use of new technology. They may want to destroy the factory or computer facility but only after the technology is turned against the adversary.

The Erosion of the Traditional International Order, Beyond the State System

The impact of technology is having a profound impact on the international system by challenging the continued existence of the nation-state system — formalized by the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which arbitrarily recognized the states as the primary units in the conduct of international relations — thus replacing the traditional empires. The litmus test of the state was that it was outwardly a sovereign entity, sovereign because it at least had the monopoly of force over a given territory and was recognized by other states in their conduct of diplomacy. The primacy of force was used to recognize and justify the geographical, if not the psychosocial, boundaries that made up the major individual component in international affairs. While colonialism and imperialism would enable various states to acquire their own modern empires, it was the strong states that determined the direction of global affairs. Moreover, even with the end of colonialism, the call for self-determination and independence inspired political conflicts and insurgencies, which led to the emergence of many new states that were, at

least in the context of international law, recognized as sovereign entities. The state-centric system still remains at the center of diplomacy, conflict, and accommodation in world affairs.

The traditional order, however, is now being challenged by a wide variety of nonstate actors — for example:

- a. Universal and regional intergovernmental organizations
- b. Transnational guerrilla and terrorists groups
- c. Multinational corporations
- d. Nongovernmental organizations (rapidly growing in number and in a variety of functional areas).³

The reality is that the expansion of the international order — largely created by the technological aspects of globalization — has made the official boundaries of the nation states increasingly permeable to the mass migration of people as well as the dissemination of foreign and often objectionable values to states, which still rule traditional societies. One would add that the proliferation of global criminal enterprises has created further violence and instability. Equally important is the contraction of the international order where the call for self-determination is proclaimed over the Internet to provoke or feed subnational conflicts in existing states. This contraction has magnified the call and hope for self-determination of groups who by their small size in the past could not make their demands known to their own potential followers, much less a larger international order.

What is particularly significant is that we now see the expansion and contraction of the international order through the impact of globalization. This situation has created a major dynamic in international affairs. The assertion of traditional values in a particular country will also include a call for an expansion of those values — be they religious, secular, political, or a combination of all of them — to a region or even globally. There is nothing especially unique in this transnational quality when one considers such forces as the rise of the Pan Slav movement, the global outreach of communism, the call for democratization, and now the call for global jihad. But contemporary movements and beliefs are increasingly undermining the unique aspects of individual states, especially through the use of the communication revolution and cyberspace. The latter has enabled groups to have the ability to combine the parochial with universal goals and amplify the demand for changes within and beyond the boundaries of the existing state system.

In effect the concepts of state sovereignty, state diplomacy, and inter-state warfare — with their emphasis on order, physical boundaries, a monopoly of force, and even a degree of ethnic, religious, tribal, or racial unity — are changing. These changes help to explain the evolving conflict environment in general and more specifically, the changing nature of insurgency.

The Core of Conflict, the Organic Quest for Community versus the Mechanistic Existence of the State

At the core of the understanding — and dealing with the changing international environment and the intrinsically related conflict environment — is an appreciation through which one must address two different constructs.

On one hand, a central demand of those experiencing the dislocation created by globalization is the quest for community. This quest is not measured by physical boundaries, sovereignty, the classic elements of state power, or other factors of international politics. Rather, the construct evolves around a concept of community. Rupert Emerson defined *nation* as a particular type of community:

The nation is a community of people who feel that they belong together in a double sense that they share deeply a significant common heritage and that they have a common destiny in the future.

The nation is today the largest community which when the chips are down, effectively command men's loyalty, overriding the claims of lesser communities within it and those which cut across it to potentially enfold it within a greater society, reaching ultimately to mankind as a whole. In this sense a nation may be called a 'terminal community' with the implication that it is for the present purposes the effective end of the road for man as a social animal, the end of the working solidarity among men.⁴

Emerson wrote this definition in 1963 when the anti-colonial struggle for independence, which often took the form of an insurgency, obscured the reality of ethnic and sectarian conflict. The optimism existed within the leadership of the emerging states and with external observers. That independence would create a unified nation state. But it was Han Morgenthau's definition of a nation that perhaps best defined the character of a community or the nation as a *terminal* community when he noted that "a nation is an abstraction."⁵

These psychosocial aspects of *community* stand in marked contrast to the nature of the state with its emphasis on law, bureaucracy, order, defined geographical boundaries, and sovereignty. The continued focus on the state-centric model, particularly as a result of the impact of globalization, ignores the potency of expanding and contracting communities fueled by the impact of modern communication and the Internet communities that may ultimately rival the state. The reliance on the mechanistic approach to what can be called state building is quite different from community building whether it is subnational, transnational, or a combination of both. Moreover, as we will see, the development of virtual communities will add another crucial dimension to the changes in the international system.

Unless the key role of the community concept is recognized and moves beyond the state-centric model, we will fail to understand the dynamics of the changing international and conflict environment. Those involved in seeking to counter global insurgency will not only be fighting the last war but also the last insurgency.

Beyond the Traditional Spectrum of Left to Right, the Emergence of a Proto-Ideology

In one of the pioneering comparative studies on terrorism Charles Russell and Bowman Miller noted the following:

The question of a political philosophy is a most difficult one to treat as a category since it defies political response Three basic ideological tendencies are at play among most terrorist groups operating today — anarchism, Marxist Leninism, and nationalism. It is the combination of these three in specific context that produces the variant left-extremist philosophies espoused by most terrorists today.⁶

This study has no specific reference to the long-term development of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism that would come to fruition after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Religious belief was of course significant before that time, such as in the context of the Protestant conflict in Northern Ireland and in other cases of sectarian strife; but Russell and Miller focused largely on groups that were extensively involved in operations beyond their own country or region. The emphasis on Marxist-Leninist thought comes as no surprise given the period in which their study took place.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and its surrogates practiced surrogate warfare against the United States and its allies.⁷ As for anarchy, the traditional philosophy that justified many acts of terrorism by Western European groups was significant at the time. In a very real sense, that tradition continues today in the diverse groups that engage in violent acts against what they view to be the results of globalization.

As noted earlier we have seen the development of anti-Western, anti-mass society, anti-secularism, and anti-technology being used often in combination with other national and transnational demands to motivate and justify acts and campaigns of terrorism. In effect what we may be seeing is a dangerous marriage of convenience where various groups will work together in their call for the destruction of the existing international order. We may, in essence, be seeing the emergence of what could be called a proto-ideology of global insurgency and global terrorism.

What is particularly dangerous about this potential alliance of disparate groups is the fact that they have already been joined by other actors whose motivation is primarily for profit through the resort to criminal enterprises ranging from the drug trade to money laundering and to a wide variety of illicit organized and unorganized criminal acts. This alliance is leaving its mark in the drug trafficking and is likely to increase in the coming years. What is also dangerous is that in the alliances among apolitical terrorists under the guise of a political coloration will increasingly control significant localities in the gray areas where government exists in name only. We may witness the emergence of the gray area and counterstate.⁸

Finally, in the convoluted and clandestine world of both insurgency and terrorism we will see one or more groups manipulated by others with different agendas without their knowledge. In this period of seamless terrorism, one can suggest that some right-wing extremist group in the United States might be a stalking horse for religious-based terrorists overseas.⁹ The spectrum of ideology may be changing in part because of the capability through the Internet to strengthen and gain supporters. What those changes are and what will constitute the new threats in the mid and long term remain to be seen.

From Geopolitics to Spatial Politics, Reevaluating Territoriality

Perhaps the most overt impact of technology in the new threat environment is the result of the revolution in two areas: transportation and communication. In the first case, the introduction of jet aircraft on a large scale in the 1960s made the world smaller as the time to reach new locations rapidly diminished. But what was specifically significant in regard to the threat environment was the fact that a new generation of terrorists could seize aircraft and in so doing ignore the arbitrary physical and legal boundaries of nation states. These individuals engaged in nonterritorial terrorism — a form of terror that is not confined to a clearly delineated area.¹⁰ In effect they were engaging in what could be called a form of low-intensity aerospace warfare but using the medium of aerospace to carry out their operations.

At the same time, the revolution in communications, particularly television, enabled the individuals and groups to dramatize and publish their cause to a mass audience that was not previously available to the most dedicated practitioner of “armed propaganda” and “propaganda by the deed.”¹¹ The spectacles of the 1960s and 1970s seized the attention of the public and created a major challenge to a world where until then, aviation schedules, passenger comfort, and new routes took precedence over any meaningful security measures that unfortunately were not legally and operationally mandated.

Governments were ill prepared to deal with nonterritorial threats and acts. As the skyjacking continued, a new and ominous concern became a frightful reality. The skyjackers and bombers were developing the capability to create their own man-delivered intercontinental missile system. The culmination or nadir of this ability took place on September 11, 2001 when man-guided missiles in the form of airplanes attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. It was unfortunately a logical outcome in the development of skyjackings. The warning was there. While security specialists were validly concerned about past actions in the form of skyjackings and bombings, they did not attend to the new and more horrendous possibilities. As noted before 9/11,

... weapons need not be sophisticated to be destructive. One only has to consider what would have happened if the pilot of the lone single engine aircraft, which crashed near the White House ... on

September 12, 1994 had filled his plane with something as simple as a fertilizer bomb.¹²

The new threat environment in cyberspace has further increased the capabilities of the practitioners of many forms of violence and created many challenges. With the mass introduction of the Internet, the nonterritorial nature of conflict is rapidly changing. Yet the responses to the challenges are still impeded by the constraints of sovereignty, individual national interest, jurisdictional issues, and bureaucratic turf battles. When in the fullest sense, both insurgents and terrorists are globalizing their operations, the international system continues to act in a territorial manner.

The territorial mode, however, does not imply that when violence occurs it is not in a sense local. Former Speaker of the House, Tip O'Neil often cited for his maxim, "all politics is local." To modify that comment, all terrorism and insurgency is local and must be dealt with by those in their physical field of operations. How to deal with a global nonterritorial, far broader global field of operations is only now being addressed. Many governments, military forces, intelligence agencies, and security forces still think territorially in an increasingly globalized and nonterritorial world. A notable exception is the United States Special Operations Command and supporting intelligence organizations with a charter for global synchronization of the U.S. counterterrorism planning effort.

The emergence of this nonterritorial conflict environment, whether it is through the medium of aerospace or cyberspace, will be a central concern in this study as we address the nature of and the means needed to combat global insurgency and global terrorism.

Conclusion

We see and hear less use of the military adage, "Think out of the box." It is even more important now in the increasingly globalized and nonterritorial world in which we live to exercise creativity and imagination. The temptation, however, is to remain in the confines of the box, secure in the current conventional wisdom, instrumental judgments, and existing doctrines. The suggestion is to not only avoid this temptation but consider whether it is ever appropriate to be in the box.

3. The Changing Conflict Environment

Changes in the international arena are altering the existing conflict environment. The causes are increasingly rapid technological innovation, the expansion and contraction of a community concept that is redefining the nature of the state, and the nonterritorial character of international politics, coupled with the impact of cyberspace. While traditional armed conflicts — ranging from localized strife to state-on-state and coalition warfare — will certainly continue, Clausewitz’s “fog of war” will become even denser as a wide variety of adversaries will seek their disparate goals through armed conflict. Furthermore, that dense fog will further obscure the causes, dynamics, and outcomes of armed conflicts since belligerents will be more numerous and less identifiable with their own unique strategies and goals.

While traditional warfare will continue, rules of engagement and the laws of armed conflict will increasingly become less clear. War in its many forms will in all likelihood become less structured, where battles will not be conducted in clearly defined areas of operations. Vague, uncertain lines between opposing militaries, paramilitary forces, police, the new mercenaries, tribal and sectarian groups, and other participants will supplant the outward order of conventional war constructs. The ongoing blurring of the line between what constitutes combatants versus noncombatants will become even more out of focus. An old order is passing as Martin Van Creveld succinctly notes:

Large scale, conventional war — as today understood by today’s principal military powers — may indeed be at its last gasp; however, war itself, war as such, is alive and kicking and about to enter a new epoch.¹³

If “war as such, is alive and kicking” as Van Creveld postulates, it will be *nontrinitarian war*, not waged in the Wesphalian model since “... present day violence does not distinguish between governments, armies, and people.”¹⁴ One can raise two serious questions, however, concerning the eminent author’s view:

- a. Given the changing nature of the international environment, the transforming structures and new players, and the medium in which

battles will take place, are we now confronted with nontrinitarian war or a broader form of armed conflict?

- b. Moreover, are we also witnessing fundamental changes in what until recently has been called *low-intensity conflict*?

However defined, the conflict environment — like the broader international environment — is changing. The direction of these changes will help determine the emergence of global insurgency and the continued importance of nonterritorial terrorism.¹⁵

Major Characteristics of the Changing Conflict Environment

Having discussed the major characteristics of the changing international environment, it is now appropriate to relate those characteristics to the changing conflict environment. These changes subsequently will provide the basis to understand the new characteristics of global insurgency and terrorism.

At the outset it is important to stress that those future conflicts and wars will no longer primarily take place in territorially defined areas, more specifically within the boundaries of the nation state. As noted earlier the state system is now changing, and indeed eroding, and the monopoly of or use of force is no longer primarily between and among states. The prospects are for more subnational and transnational conflicts. At the subnational level, the ethnic conflicts — which were obscured before the end of the Cold War because of great power competition — have come to the forefront in what can aptly be called the new world disorder. But in many instances these conflicts are both sub and transnational since the call for ethnic identity has been promoted in not only localized conflicts but also transnational ones asserting the identity of people beyond the existing nation states.

The relationships between localized, regional, and transnational armed conflict is not new. The calls for self determination that led to the end of the colonial empires also inspired a wide variety of groups to call for their independence. What they had was regarded to be the legacy of an arbitrarily imposed state system based on imperial boundaries. The battles in Kashmir, Sri Lanka, the assertion of the Kurds, the tribal conflicts within the Middle East and Africa are the continuing legacy of a past imperial history.

Technology has altered how that legacy is asserted and how new groups are seeking their own identity. The impact of jet transportation has physically enabled ethnic, religious, and other groups who feel deprived to expand their

operations and take the war home to what they view to be the far enemy, be it Moscow, London, Mumbai, or Washington. Moreover, through modern television communications they now can publicize their cause far beyond the geographical boundaries where the conflicts are or were originally initiated. One can anticipate that virtual or imaginary communities will come into existence through their prisms of reinterpreting history and spreading the message of conquest, subjugation, and repression as the justification to revolt far beyond what could be regarded as the initial cradle of the conflict.¹⁶

*... virtual or imaginary communities
will come into existence through their
prisms of reinterpreting history ...*

The nonterritorial nature of such a conflict has very serious socio-psychological implications that must be understood by those who are primarily experienced with geographically delineated conflicts. Such conflicts will of course continue to be significant and may require the resort to military force, but the battlefield is increasingly transcendental, for it deals with beliefs that move beyond an existing battlefield. The spillover of these beliefs will test even the best trained armed forces schooled in the art of counterinsurgency to contain a conflict to a given locale, be it within existing states.

The nonterritorial nature of conflict environments will most certainly place additional strains on those who must engage the adversary. Military and police forces can be regarded as armed bureaucracies operating in clearly defined areas of operation, with clearly identified jurisdictions, missions, and areas of operations. The difficulty is that the adversaries are not constrained by such considerations, through their appeal to real, virtual, or imaginary communities. They seek to establish an organic entity as contrasted to a mechanistic-bureaucratic link between them and the group, be it a tribe or a religious-faction, that they purport to represent and whose support they seek to acquire.

It is therefore vital that those who must plan and operate in what can be called an organic battlefield need to move beyond their comfort zone of major commands, areas of operation, and the other aspects of what has been noted earlier as the structured violence of modern warfare. This ability to think, organize, and act nonterritorially is required by a new generation of policymakers, military leaders, and strategists who will not only have to think out of the box but think beyond territorially and bureaucratically based boundaries of aerospace and cyberspace.

The effort to reorient will be very daunting because of tradition acting as a barrier to military innovation. Even if one addresses the roles of traditional military, police, and other security forces, the roles are increasingly becoming less clearly defined given the nature of the adversary. How to counter terrorists is a case in point. Should they be primarily treated as criminals and therefore fall under the purview of law enforcement, or at what time do they pose an essential military threat to be dealt with by the armed forces? Traditionally terrorism has been treated as a law enforcement problem where acts of terror are primarily domestic in scope. But what about acts of international terrorism, which cut across national jurisdictions and may call for the use of specialized military units? How does one differentiate criminal threats and threats to national security with the development of what John O'Neill called "seamless terrorism," where lines between domestic and international groups and operations are blurred?¹⁷ Moreover, who is responsible for countering the dangerous alliance between terrorist groups and criminal enterprises, which are now increasingly international in scope and operations?

Secondly, with the diminution of the state system, the international system (sovereignty and the legitimate monopoly of force) is being replaced by the emergence of the new mercenaries who are not part of the security organizations of a state. Moreover as Xavier Ruffer notes, we now have a number of gray areas, areas of ungovernability where no one state or group has the capacity to concert control over a territory, be it within or beyond the confines of traditional legalistic boundaries. This vacuum often leads to the related problem of the increased hiring and use of private forces in the employ of corporations and other entities in gray areas. In addition, the public's increased lack of confidence in many post-industrial states that law enforcement can effectively cope with present and new threats has led to the explosion of private security forces of all types and of greatly varying quality.

These changes will be exacerbated by recent technological developments, which add yet another complex dimension in the battle against global insurgency and terrorism. The importance of cyberspace, as noted earlier, will lead to a new form of conflict, not the traditional territorially based insurgency — "the war in the shadows" but a war of abstraction, of images, and the vital role of perception. We are witnessing the emergence of virtual terrorism and virtual insurgency.

Perhaps the most disturbing thing, in reference to potential future trends, may be the ability of the terrorists to alter and magnify their threat capabilities by altering the perception of the people watching through the use of the Internet and other forms of modern communication.¹⁸

Future conflicts may be similar to the Indonesian *wayang* show where the audience does not see either the puppet or the puppeteer, just the shadow on the screen. But in this new era, yet another complication arrives. Who is the puppeteer in the often impenetrable clouds of cyberspace?

It is in the realm of both real and amorphous conflict that military, police, corporate, and private security forces as well as other nonstate unofficial armed groups will have to address the complex changing natures of global insurgency and terrorism.

Conclusion

The new conflict environment certainly does not mark the end of state-on-state, subnational, or transnational, territorially based armed conflicts and warfare. But the presence of new actors, the complex and often clandestine nature of the adversary, the ability to use modern weapons in support of perceived or real grievances, and the possibility of altering perception will be a challenge to those who must fight in a global battlefield. As we shall see, this new environment raises serious issues in reference to how a global insurgency, as contrasted to territorial, will have to be fought along with the changing nature of terrorism. The challenge will be particularly demanding given the difficulty in finding the adversary. One is reminded of the quote from the movie *The Scarlet Pimpernel* where the hero is a British Baronet who rescues French nobility from the agents of Maximilien Robespierre during the Reign of Terror. The frustration of tracking down the Pimpernel reminds one of a different time and a different place:

They seek him here, they seek him there. Those Frenchies seek him everywhere. Is he in heaven or is he in hell that ... illusive Pimpernel.¹⁹

Those who are hunting Osama bin Laden could very much express their frustration in a similar manner.

4. Continuity, the Traditional Elements

Modern insurgency is the product of a rich historical development. The purpose here is not to survey that history but to identify and address continuities that can be found in the evolution of modern insurgencies, which may help provide an understanding of both current trends and future challenges. In effect this chapter will provide a base point from which a broad analysis can proceed. The aim is to identify alternative policies and strategies that can meet the crucial challenge of countering changes in the nature and conduct of warfare.

This author has no intent to get involved in a semantic battle over the myriad definitions of insurgency, much less the even more intense debates that surround the attempts to define terrorism. Rather, some selected definitions are used to identify the major elements of both forms of violence. At the outset, the concise definitions of the following three sources provide a solid basis for identifying the major characteristics of what is regarded to be contemporary insurgency:

- a. The *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* defines insurgency as “the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or a movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority.”²⁰
- b. The *U. S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* definition is similar but as we shall note, adds a crucial additional characteristic.

... an insurgency is an organized protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.²¹

- c. The third definition, written by one of the pioneering scholars on modern terrorism, Bard E. O'Neill, provides more detail and adds another characteristic that will be discussed.

Insurgency can be defined as a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses *political resources* (e.g., organizational expertise,

propaganda, and demonstrations) and *violence* to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics. [Italics added]²²

O'Neill notes a wide variety of different insurgencies — Anarchist, Egalitarian, Traditionalist, Apocalyptic-Utopian, Pluralist, Secessionist, Reformist, Preservationist, and Commercialist. He also says there are major characteristics that to a degree differentiate insurgency from other forms of conflict and warfare.²³ These characteristics are important not only in understanding contemporary insurgencies but also how they may change in the future.

Major Characteristics of Insurgency

While the characteristics of an insurgency vary widely, six major ones need to be addressed before we look at insurgencies and counterinsurgency strategies:

- a. The primacy of politics
- b. The protracted nature of insurgency — from leadership policy and public opinion
- c. The indirect approach — more important than ever
- d. Special Operations Forces
- e. The significance of psychological, sociological, and anthropological approaches in an insurgency — the need for an expanded capability
- f. The impact of technology, communication, and perception — entering uncharted areas.

The Primacy of Politics. It has been long recognized that war is an extension of politics. In *On War* Clausewitz noted, "... war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means."²⁴ But one can suggest that in an insurgency, politics is not an extension but at the very core of, the *raison d'être* for, insurgencies. More specifically one can suggest that insurgency ultimately is a form of political warfare, where military action is subordinate to political goals and actions. Perhaps more than other factors, this has been the most difficult for militaries to recognize.

Particularly in the United States, the primacy of politics has not been always fully recognized and jointly discussed in detail by civilian policy-makers and senior military officers to provide necessary guidance for the

deployment and use of military force. The experience in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan underscores the “American way of fighting war,” which does not adequately focus on the primacy of politics.²⁵ As in the past, there are countries, ideologies, movements, and cultures that view politics and armed conflict as intimately joined together.

Despite treaties and pronouncements to the contrary, there are no universally agreed ideals in regard to the nature of politics, war, and peace—despite the global interdependence now established through advanced technologies. The lack of homogeneity reflects the fundamental fact that “in short the world is divided, conflicted, and anarchical by definition.”²⁶ It would appear that this statement refers to an obvious truth. Yet it is often ignored by those who try to conduct warfare and insurgency based on their own view of what they perceive to be universalistic values, imposing upon other cultures that do not share the same value set.²⁷

The Protracted Nature of Insurgency—from Leadership Policy and Public Opinion. If we fail to recognize the primacy of politics as a guiding aspect of contemporary insurgencies, we have a more complex problem, especially faced by democratic orders that must deal with insurgencies. The problem is the leadership’s failure to clearly verbalize (for the public to understand) the protracted nature of an insurgency, which is ultimately a test of political will rather than military might. Ironically this failure has been exacerbated by assumptions about what technology can do instead of its limits in a human-intensive form of warfare.

The protracted nature of conflict was, of course, clearly enunciated and refined by Mao Tse-Tung. The test of wills, however, goes back in history including the U.S. Revolutionary War where both sides almost lost the war through political, mental, and physical attrition. Today, even despite the call for the *long war against terrorism*, the public wants its wars short, decisive, and with a clear victory and few casualties. The Operation Desert Storm brief war (1990-1991) is a conflict that has yet to be fully resolved politically or militarily. The same can be said about Afghanistan. Despite the fact that we are in an age of insurgency, where protracted war continues, we seek instant solutions and quick victories. Announced deadlines for our involvement signals the adversary that our resolve is diminished. It is incumbent upon political leaders to clearly justify U.S. involvement in long-term conflicts by succinctly indicating how our national interests are threatened.

Given the questionable existence of weapons of mass destruction that was used to justify our second involvement in Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom), the task of gaining the support of a cynical public has become problematic. What is therefore needed, not simply now but in regard to future threats, is leadership that by words and actions can create the requisite national will to engage in protracted conflicts. That will be especially difficult since we no longer have the national consensus on security issues that existed during the Cold War. This need for resolution goes beyond the position Washington takes. Our allies, especially NATO, are also confronting their involvement in protracted conflict, and the extent of their dedication is certain to take into account economic realities.

As we observe the continuing development of global insurgency, London, Paris, and Berlin are being forced to reconsider their reluctance to act based on new threats that are evolving in their own countries. The protracted nature of such conflicts is largely recognized by the U.S. military although the temptation to find technological solutions remains. What is particularly troublesome is not the resolve of the American public at large. Rather, we have highly trained and dedicated armed services that are facing physical, emotional, and logistical fatigue through constant redeployments of regular, reserve, and National Guard forces. For them *the long war* is already too long. The implications of this fatigue are addressed in the next chapter.

The Indirect Approach—More Important Than Ever. It is interesting to see that the term *indirect approach* is not found in *The DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. The idea is to dislocate your opponent's political and military position by attacking him indirectly. B. H. Liddell Hart writes:

The true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this.²⁸

The goal is the avoidance of battle. This fits current counterinsurgency doctrine that seeks to apply all the elements of power in countering insurgency, relegating the military element to security duties.

This approach plays a crucial role in the conduct of either fighting or countering an insurgency. It has a vital role in counterinsurgency, for it recognizes the need to have the knowledge and sophistication to defeat the insurgents through a whole host of measures ranging from political

subversion to small, covert operations. Also, it is a critical concept for use by insurgents who must avoid a direct confrontation with conventional forces. In contrast to the overwhelming use of force encouraged by technology, the indirect approach requires not only a deep appreciation of the political, social, and psychological battlefield but a sensitivity to work with a wide variety of indigenous parties, or surrogates, who have their own agenda but are willing to establish marriages of commitment or convenience.

One must recognize that such marriages are fraught with possible danger as in the case of the blow back created by arming the Mujahideen, but any successful counterinsurgency (COIN) must identify and use a whole host of potential allies ranging from tribes, paramilitary forces, and other less traditional armed forces. The critical role of the indirect approach is championed by Thomas H. Henriksen in *Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency and the Indirect Approach*:

The Indirect Approach to insurgency is now the ascendant strategy to confront low-intensity conflict, whether terrorism or insurgency. This Indirect Approach relies in irregular warfare techniques and COIN capabilities to combat violent subversion, and to protect the indigenous population. It demands that U.S. and local forces defeat the insurgents and then institute street-level protection followed by indigenous governance along Western lines.²⁹

As noted earlier, there are questions about whether the model of governance can or should be Western. But even more daunting are the broader challenges to the use of the indirect approach when it is applied to the global environment.

Special Operations Forces. A grudging but growing awareness initially occurred after the Vietnam trauma and largely starting with the reaction to the abortive rescue attempt at Desert One (Operation Eagle Claw, April 1980). The awareness was of the need to have highly trained unconventional forces for U.S. missions in the changing conflict environment. Those changes have been impressive. No longer are the various Special Operations Forces (SOF) looked down upon as a necessary distraction from the primary need for conventional forces for conventional wars. Certainly Operation Desert Storm in particular, which was largely a war of conventional forces, vindicated those who maintained that conventionally trained and equipped forces

with increasingly high technological weapons would succeed in defeating the adversary. The events that followed the victory, however, underscored that short-term military victories would not resolve long-term enduring problems in a country or region. If anything, SOF regained a strategic luster.

There are, however, two concerns that need to be addressed in regard to the utility of special operations units involved in fighting both local and global insurgencies:

- a. Now that the Special Forces have become a branch of the U.S. Army, they have achieved a degree of professional respectability as have other SOF. This respect is in marked contrast to the post-Vietnam War era when SOF were viewed to be composed of snake eaters who realized that higher command would elude them if they stayed in the special operations community. The intent of this statement is not to suggest that the new generation of special operators is either better or worse than those who preceded them. Rather, organizationally the concern is that with respectability comes conventional wisdom — a wisdom that might to a degree conventionalize Special Forces.
- b. Equally troublesome is the concern that, as in the past, conventional military leaders do not fully appreciate the strengths and limitations when employing SOF. We may see attempts to expand the missions of these forces to mission areas beyond their traditional roles of specialized direct actions, unconventional warfare, COIN, counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, military information support operations, and the like.

If there are serious questions associated with the increasing demands placed on unconventional forces associated with current insurgencies, the questions will become even more complex in addressing their roles in global insurgency and global terrorism. We will return to these concerns when we address the demands imposed by what is now called *hybrid warfare*.³⁰

The Significance of Psychological, Sociological, and Anthropological Approaches in an Insurgency—the Need for an Expanded Capability. The psychological dimensions of either conducting or countering an insurgency have always been significant, particularly for the insurgents. Ordinarily, the weaker adversary seeks to magnify their capabilities by either of the following or both:

- a. Using terrorism and other forms of coercion to intimidate the populace and discredit the government's ability to provide security
- b. Winning over the population to their cause.

This use of a negative and positive approach in strengthening an insurgency is related to the tactics of propaganda and associated actions also used in political warfare. The threatened government in a territorially based insurgency will also use both approaches to either strengthen its control over the population or engage in differing degrees of reform to win the hearts and minds of its citizens. As we shall see, particularly in addressing the emergence of global insurgency and global terrorism, both approaches are now subject to changes that will be discussed in the next chapter.

What has been significant in the past — in reference to addressing the challenges created by an insurgency — is the crucial role of understanding the cultural environment in which the insurgents and the counterinsurgents operate. Whether it is to develop and train COIN forces or to seek the initiative in the political battle that accompanies an insurgency, those who oppose the insurgents will be flying blind without knowledge of the cultural environment in which they operate. There is a growing awareness of the need to develop the cultural IQ necessary to comprehend the variety of different clans, tribes, and ethnic and sectarian groups with their own social networks that determine where loyalty is vested. The understanding of these networks, particularly in areas of ungovernability, are vital for those involved in what may be a variety of insurgencies in a particular gray area, be it subnational or transnational in scope.

The Impact of Technology, Communication, and Perception — Entering Uncharted Areas. Perhaps the most significant developments in regard to understanding the changing nature of insurgencies are based on a major theme throughout this monograph — namely, the impact of technology and globalization in a changing international and conflict environment. As noted earlier, the development of television and satellite communication enabled insurgents and terrorists to dramatize and maximize their impact through the media. Although in Vietnam the Tet Offensive of 1968 was a military success for the Vietnamese and U.S. militaries, it was a political defeat. The images of Vietnamese insurgents attacking the U.S. Embassy and the general insurgent offensive carried a message to the American public: “the light at the end of the tunnel had been extinguished. President Johnson’s

War and Administration were at an end.”³¹ On the same token, despite its past attacks, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) did not achieve the recognition it needed until the Munich Massacre of 1972. Through that event they became a force to be recognized in international affairs.

What is particularly significant of such watershed events is the fact that public perception, values, and resolve were altered through the impact of images; these were images that were often taken out of context and usually enhanced the message conveyed by the participants of violence. As discussed in the next chapter, the impact of the Internet and the World Wide Web has greatly increased the ability of both terrorists and insurgents to magnify their significance by altering the perception of a global audience. In addition, netwar is altering the imagery of conflict.

Conclusion

Even before the planning begins for engaging in a COIN effort, those responsible would be well advised to keep in mind the major characteristics of such a conflict. The primacy of politics and the protracted nature of insurgency must be subject to early and extensive analysis before any campaign is launched. There must be clarity of purpose based on understanding insurgency before all the necessary elements of power are mustered and integrated into fully developed counterterrorism policies, strategies, and campaigns.

5. From Battlefield to Cyberspace

As changes in the international environment accelerate, we need to reconsider the effectiveness of traditional and current approaches to countering global insurgency and global terrorism. This reevaluation does not suggest that past and current approaches are not basically valid. We have learned, and the application of that experience must be recognized as essential and operationalized. The approaches may need to be adjusted, however, to meet the new faces of global adversaries. This chapter will address a number of the approaches that illustrate the need for revision.

Global Insurgency, Rhetoric or Reality

The expanded scope of terrorism and insurgency has received much attention over the years. At first the focus moved from terrorism to transnational and then international terrorism. The emphasis on an international threat was further enunciated in what became to the United States a global war on terrorism (GWOT.) While we have always recognized the international component of insurgencies, that component was essentially related to one that was territorially based. That focus has changed as more scholars recognize that one can specifically identify a global insurgency that cannot simply be viewed as an extension of a traditional geographically based conflict. As the *United States Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* notes:

Insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) are complex subsets of warfare. Globalization, technological advancement, urbanization, and extremists who conduct suicide attacks for their cause have certainly influenced contemporary conflict; however, warfare in the 21st century retains many of the characteristics it has exhibited since ancient times.³²

This emphasis on the historical characteristics is further affirmed:

Insurgency is typically a form of internal war, one that occurs primarily within a state, not between states and one that contains at least some elements of civil war.³³

Thus in discussing the basic nature of insurgency one often finds an emphasis on what is *typical* rather than on significant present and future developments

that are likely to take place. Yet it is important to note that there is recognition of the changes, for as the Field Manual notes:

Today's operational environment also includes a new kind of insurgency, one that seeks to impose revolutionary change worldwide. Al Qaeda is a well-known example of such an insurgency. This movement seeks to transform the Islamic world and reorder its relationships with other regions and cultures.³⁴

This global threat is not viewed to be the norm, however, and at the very time when it may become even more common. Moreover in Chapter 3 of the Field Manual an apparently contradictory statement is made — namely, “Insurgencies are local.”³⁵ Particularly at the tactical level, the focus of intelligence will largely be limited to a primarily territorially delineated area, since that is where the activities of the insurgents are taking place. But such a focus does not address what may be the very important relationship between globalized and local conflicts. More specifically, such a focus may not be related to significant global intelligence requirements that may

Those involved in COINs will need to act locally but remain strategically astute thinking globally.

determine the tactical behavior of an adversary in a geographically limited area. This observation does not suggest that tactical intelligence in a localized area of operations is not vital, for that is where conflicts on the ground are taking place. Those involved

in COINs will need to act locally but remain strategically astute thinking globally.

The usual emphasis on territorially based insurgencies can act as a serious impediment to the formulation of doctrine and strategies to combat insurgency in the growing nonterritorial area. This arena is beyond internal warfare that transcends individual states, includes regional and global conflicts, and extends into cyberspace. Traditional requirements for COIN operations are still valid, but they only retain that validity if they accommodate to fighting in a new nonterritorial medium.

We are confronted with the emergence of global insurgency, an insurgency that may have its root causes in a territorially based insurgency within or among the often arbitrary legalistic boundaries of states. Global insurgency takes place beyond those boundaries, however, and is global in nature. The global insurgents may acquire material support from territorially

based insurgent organizations and political movements. They may also be independent actors who justify their insurgency based on their narrative or perception of a real or imaginary territorial insurgency in which they are not directly involved. Their goals are not the traditional seizure of state power and the transformation of its social and political order. Rather, their goals are a fundamental transformation of vast regions in the broader context of what they ultimately believe to be a global strategy.

Recognizing the emergence of global insurgency does not suggest that we have a clear unity of outlook or fully developed and coordinated objectives among the insurgents. The potential for the expansion of global insurgencies, however, should be recognized and countered. The threat is real.

The following section will selectively identify key requirements that are often cited as necessary to defeat what are essentially territorially based insurgencies. The section will then address if and how these requirements may be employed to counter global insurgencies.

The Battle for Legitimacy, but Whose?

At the forefront of combating a traditional insurgency is the need to establish the legitimacy of the threatened government. As Max G. Manwaring notes in his pioneering book *Uncomfortable Wars*:

Experience shows that legitimacy is the most important single dimension in a war against subversion. The thrust of a revolutionary program relies on grievances such as political social discrimination as the means through which the government is attacked. This is the essential nature of the threat from an insurgency, and it is here that any response must begin. A campaign that fails to understand this and only responds to enemy forces is likely to fail.³⁶

The succinct definition by Bard O'Neill will be used in the following discussion of the vital role legitimacy plays in determining the outcome of an insurgency and more specifically, the unique challenges COIN organizations face when confronted with the changing demands created by a global insurgency:

Legitimacy and *illegitimacy* are terms used to determine whether existing aspects of politics are considered moral or immoral — right or wrong — by the population or selected elements thereof.³⁷

Legitimacy is at the heart of an insurgency. While an insurgency can be waged within countries, a region, or globally, one can suggest that it is ultimately a battle over what values will prevail and what values will be discredited in the conflict between the authorities and those who would seek to overthrow them. Moreover, as noted earlier, it is a proudly psychosocial battle that will determine who will be able to either impose values or have their values accepted, or a combination of imposition and acceptance within a community. It is ultimately within a community, the *abstraction*, where victory or defeat will be determined. It is within a community whether it be a clan tribe, an ethnic or religious group, a sub-nation, a nation, or even a wider community where identity and values will act as a unifying or divisive force.

The challenge goes beyond the task of creating what we referred to as primarily a bureaucratic structure known as the state. Moreover the profound issue of determining what is legitimate is highly subjective based on the values, history, and as we shall see, the narrative of different cultures. While there may be universal values, one size does not fit all in a world where traditional orders, modernizing ones, and those that seek their own form of government based on their own values are able to compete in the community marketplace.

Most of the literature on insurgency emphasizes the need to develop approaches and programs to promote legitimacy in a threatened area. The quest for legitimacy usually takes second place, however, to strengthening the capability of an endangered government in a state faced by internal war. This secondary focus is understandable for it is always easier to create bureaucracies in strengthening the capabilities of a state than to be knowledgeable and supportive of those values that ultimately determine if a community is accepted by its people. This problem is compounded in a global insurgency.

Many of the attacks by global insurgents take place thousands of miles from where they live or where they maintain strong political, religious, cultural, and other sources of identities. The numerous attacks in distant countries and regions, especially in the capitol cities of Western Europe, underscore the point that it is not the targeted country where the fight over legitimacy is being fought. The insurgency is external and so is the question of legitimacy.

Matters are further complicated by the fact that many of the assaults are not necessarily justified based on what is happening in a distant area of

strife. Rather, global insurgents may claim their attacks are based on their own narrative of history. Thus how can one address questions of legitimacy when the terrorists, as in the case of the Madrid bombings, justify their action as a means of seeking revenge for the crusades of the Middle Ages?

To further complicate the problem — attempting to use the question of legitimacy as a major weapon in an insurgency — is the realization that the number of global attacks is not related to opposing a particular government's legitimacy. Rather, the number represents an opposition to an entire region and its social, economic, and political orders. In a sense, if legitimacy is a cornerstone in combating a traditional insurgency, how does one attempt to strengthen regional, transnational, and international legitimacy — units that face the assault of the global insurgent terrorist?

Finally and as noted earlier, large parts of the world have no government in control; in addition, some nonstate actors are not concerned about achieving any degree of legitimacy. For the drug cartels, the various other international criminal enterprises, the values associated with legitimacy have no significance. They are primarily interested in conducting their illicit activities and the ability to make a profit either by controlling a government, coercing a population, or employing a combination of both; this focus is much in the tradition of various multinational corporations. The bombings and assault on the Mexican government and civilians by the drug cartels underscore the fact the country is now faced with what can be called a profit-driven insurgency, and the level of violence is likely to increase.

The old models concerning legitimacy as applied to a territorially or regionally based insurgency will have to be modified to meet the challenges of a globalized *irregular* or *small* war — ironically *small* in character but large in field of operations and potential impact. The importance of legitimacy has been enhanced because the issues associated with values, and the new capabilities to disseminate them, are vital in the global conflict.

Unity of Action, Trying to Move Beyond the Country Team

The quest for legitimacy requires an ability to operationalize abstract values, and the quest for unity requires an ability to bring together often complex and diverse bureaucratic structures into a cohesive team. The many facets of an effort to counter an insurgency require the participation of a number of civilian and military organizations. In the case of U.S. involvement, this might include U.S. military forces, host nation (HN) military forces, HN

civil authorities (including local leaders), U.S. Government agencies, other governments' agencies, nongovernment organizations, international organizations, multinational corporations and contractors, and other multinational organizations.³⁸

The participation of so many groups often stands in stark contrast to that of a number of insurgent organizations where the key is unity of effort through relatively simple organizational designs. In the case of a traditional revolutionary movement, the insurgents may be guided by a core ideology, directed from above by a small central leadership that issues its commands through a widespread cadre. That cadre has penetrated all levels of the social and political order. We also essentially have independent cells, which are established locally, may or may not be part of a larger movement, and are very difficult to identify since they reside in their own small organizational universe.

Despite the continued call to coordinate more effectively — particularly through the existing country team, military commands, and provincial reconstruction teams — Washington still engages in COIN. They use a complex and large bureaucracy against adversaries who have recognized for a long time that in asymmetric warfare, small is not only effective but lethal. This problem is compounded when large bureaucracies seek to take the initiative away from the small units and clandestine cells that can act quickly and with great flexibility.³⁹

Unfortunately the history of the United States in fighting small wars is marked by turf battles and inertia. Despite continuing attempts at reform, counterterrorism and COIN programs do not enjoy the requisite unity of action. Bureaucratic agendas often take precedent over coordinated and uncomplicated organizational design.

How does one expand the required effort to have regional and international coherence among the COIN organizations of different governments? The global insurgents, however diverse, share a commitment for destruction and violence that often transcends their differences and enables them to work both independently and to a degree, collectively in waging their nonterritorial conflict. They may have their own unique goals but are not constrained by the demands of sovereignty and jurisdiction. Increasingly, global insurgents have potential allies whose goals may not be political but for their own reasons are willing to engage in attacks against fragile and competing organizations in an idealized international civil order. For all

these reasons, the initiative to engage in unified actions is all too often in the hands of the insurgents.

To bring the necessary unity out of diversity requires, especially at the international level, an innovative organizational approach to addressing the demands of a global insurgency. The key is a rationalization of COIN structures and organizations, which avoid the top-down layering typical of state bureaucracies. The idea is to have far more lateral sharing of information and operational capabilities among COIN organizations. It is here where technology can greatly enhance the global counterinsurgent effort.

We can use the organizational characteristics of networks that terrorists have used to enhance the counterinsurgent effort. Unity of effort must be enhanced at the operational level among basic counterinsurgent organizations and cells of various nations. The international nature of a growing threat will spur the need for far better cooperation among allies. The technology that is now available knows no geographical boundaries and is in the hands of government experts who recognize its potential. Through their expertise in net war, as well as their language and area expertise, they can “jump-start” the process of improving upon unity of action in the counterterrorism/COIN effort.

Conclusion

Despite all the developments in the evolution of COIN policy, strategy, operations, and doctrine, the tendency is to focus on its past territorial nature. The impact of technology, coupled with a changing international environment, has led to the development of a global insurgency that does not recognize the classic boundaries of states and theaters of operations. Like it or not, those involved in meeting the challenges caused by the global insurgent and terrorist must emulate them and not solely think and act territorially.

6. Terrorism in the Era of Global Insurgency

There is no question that terrorism has a long history. In addition, as history is studied, debates over definition will always occur.⁴⁰ There are differences in what is now called contemporary and post-modern terrorism. The definitional issues aside, major characteristics of terrorism differentiate it from other acts of violence. An appreciation of these factors is important in charting the current and future evolution of terrorism.⁴¹

One can suggest five major characteristics of the act:

- a. Terrorism is not mindless violence; it is an instrumental act.
- b. Terrorism is both a tactic and a strategy.
- c. Terrorism is primarily a political act.
- d. Terrorism is a form of individual and collective psychological operations.
- e. Terrorism is a political weapon
- f. Terrorism is a form of communication.⁴²

The last two characteristics have been greatly enhanced by technology and are becoming increasingly potent weapons in the hands of contemporary and future terrorists. Communication has been enhanced by technology and is now the most potent weapon in the evolution of contemporary and future terrorism. Brian Jenkins, the dean of terrorism research, succinctly noted the relationship between communication and intimidation: "Terrorism is a form of theater aimed at the people watching."⁴³ Other definitions have suggested that terrorism is the theater of the obscene where the terrorists write the script, direct the action, and are the actors who seek to intimidate not only a local but also now a global audience. Terrorism is not a force multiplier but a fear multiplier.

This monograph emphasizes the need to recognize contemporary global insurgency and terrorism as new developments that challenge the traditional assumptions and approaches concerning counterterrorism and COIN. An increasingly important change will further test those who must engage in global COIN — namely, the move of the insurgent and terrorist field of operations beyond territory and aerospace to cyberspace. This extension has created yet another set of challenges to traditional approaches. We are witnessing two interrelated developments: a) the emergence of virtual

terrorism and b) the controlling and altering of the perception of the audience that witnesses the terrorist attack.

From Narrative to Virtual Terrorism to Perceptual Change, Fighting a Denser War in the Shadows of Cyberspace

The importance of creating and using a narrative to explain and justify acts and campaigns of terrorism is not new. The narrative provides, in effect, a story that quite often relates the past to the present and explains the future hopes and goals of an organization. In preliterate societies the narrative was largely based on an oral tradition. The tradition remains today in many parts of the world. With the development of print, however, the narrative was incorporated into books, tracts, and other forms of the printed word not only to present the narrative but also to have a concrete record of it. Today, the narrative continues, now disseminated not only by books but also by the force of the Internet in the medium of cyberspace. Furthermore, the narrative is enhanced by the use of visual and moving images as well as computer graphics that often seek to strengthen the narrative in a desire to reach a targeted audience.

Terrorists are now skillfully applying all the available technologies to convey their messages. They have enunciated their origins, evolution, and justifications and goals in terms of a historical record. They have, moreover, continually portrayed themselves as victims against immoral and heartless adversaries. A consistent theme has been that the terrorists are not the perpetrators of violence but its victims and have only resorted to violence in self-defense. If the causes of violence, as they enunciate them, were eliminated — so the logic goes, the terrorism would end. By using these themes and reinforcing them with their fundamental ideologies or beliefs, the terrorists are effectively using their view of history as a defensive and offensive weapon.

Through the use of the narrative, contemporary terrorists groups have moved beyond altering and creating history to justify and achieve their goals. They now seek to alter the perception of selected and mass audiences in order to neutralize the condemnation of the acts of terrorism carried out by the terrorist organization. They seek to acquire a favorable climate of opinion and support for their cause.

The importance of creating the perceptual framework — acts of terrorism are in effect acts of self-defense based on an historical record (acts to reach

laudable goals) — cannot be understated. Unfortunately, terrorists have now refined their own form of propaganda and information warfare through the knowledge of the society in which they live, the religion they claim to rightfully interpret, and other deeply embedded sociocultural factors. Their purpose is to seize the high ground against their adversaries in what is called the *war of ideas*. If it is a war, those who are global insurgents and global terrorists have taken the initiative from those in the COIN and counterterrorism arena who are only now developing the knowledge, sensitivity, and contacts to start to offer a counternarrative. That process will take time, and time is a luxury that the authorities can ill afford to lose.

Another complexity of the narrative and its perception is the changing nature of the war of ideas. Traditionally COIN measures have placed a heavy emphasis on the importance of winning the hearts and minds of the population that is living under threats and acts of insurgency and terrorism. However, we now have two changes to consider:

- a. The battle for hearts and minds has increasingly been replaced by the battle for hearts and souls. We are now witnessing a battle over the most fundamental transcendental beliefs, which are arguably more powerful than the secular ideologies that preceded them. To the suicide bomber engaging in martyrdom operations, their actions are not based ultimately on achieving goals in this life but in the next one. This focus is not new; the history of religion is marked by the death of many martyrs from many faiths. But the acts of “martyrdom” operations, however many civilians are killed and wounded, resonate to a large audience. They instill in young men and women a desire to sacrifice themselves for the cause, whether they are driven by the power of religious belief, a strong rejection of western secular societies, or deeply rooted psychological factors.
- b. The potent combination of the narrative with its dissemination in cyberspace will in all probability become even more of a threat in the coming years. Technology, particularly related to imagery, has the capacity not only to alter but also create perceptions. “This capability is not new, but the rapid pace of innovation has given terrorists a new and increasingly powerful weapon in their arsenal of actual and virtual terrorism, violence, and destruction.

An early example of using impact of technology to create perception was seen in Orson Welles' radio episode "The War of the Worlds" on 30 October 1938.⁴⁴ That production of an attack on the earth spread panic on the East Coast of the United States when people missed the announcement that it was a fictional performance. Since that time modern communication, especially television, has provided a perceptual frame for stories. The images of the hooded terrorists at the Olympic Village in 1972 not only dramatized the Palestinian cause but also literally gave a face to modern terrorism. The level of potential sophistication was perhaps best shown in the 1997 movie *Wag the Dog* where a "real war" was fashioned on a sound stage to take the public's concern away from the domestic problems of a fictional U.S. administration.

That level of sophistication takes place today when violence is staged either in support of or against a government. In a sense, this is by itself not new; fabricated spontaneous demonstrations have been a hallmark of propaganda makers for many years. But what is different now are the ubiquitous cameras, the proliferation of what for all intents and purposes are personal television stations leveraging the Internet. Sophisticated computer photo and graphics programs permit individuals and groups ranging from small producers to larger state and nonstate actors to stage highly realistic incidents. These incidents will become the new terrorist events ranging from hostage taking to bombings to terrorist spectacles. We are now witnessing the refinement of what is in effect virtual terrorism. Even if the event is virtual but not real, it will generate the capability to spread fear to a global audience. While later investigation might prove that the event did not take place, the damage would have already been done. How does one *spike* an image? Like the bell, once it is rung, the sound cannot be stopped. We may now see *The War of the Worlds* in living three-dimensional color.

*We are now witnessing
the refinement of what is
in effect virtual terrorism.*

The problem of the challenges created by virtual terrorism have been compounded by the fact that Marshall McLuhan's dictum — "the medium is the message" — has achieved an even greater impact through the traditional mass media and the Internet. In this day, images of violence take precedence over providing the information or context in which a real or virtual act of violence takes place. The continual rerunning of the act without explanation adds yet one more element of uncertainty and fear based on an absence of the

meaningful acquisition of fact and analysis. We have what David Bradford has aptly called the CNN Drome — image without context.⁴⁵ Hollywood and Bollywood have a new competitor, one whose goals are to visually create fear in pursuit of intimidating a mass audience caught in a global insurgency. While it may appear both ironic and contradictory, virtual global insurgency and global terrorism is now a reality.

Conclusion

While the continuity in terrorists' strategies and capabilities remain, both have been altered by the impact of technology. The rise of net war and the coming of virtual insurgency have added a new dimension for those fighting in the battlefield of cyberspace. We are witnessing a form of conflict that blends the deep historical roots of conflict with innovations yet to be fully understood. As Sun Tzu envisioned, "There are not more than five primary colors (blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever been seen."⁴⁶ The outcomes in all their permutations and variations will be challenging to counteract. Chapter 7 addresses future trends.

7. Future Trends in Global Insurgency and Global Terrorism

It is a daunting and intellectually dangerous task to discern future trends in global insurgency and global terrorism. The complexities of human nature coupled with the increasing onslaught of technological innovation must temper any attempt to look beyond the immediate future, much less to the coming decades. The task is necessary, however. The fact remains that while terrorists may in their own right have a long-term view of what they seek to achieve, those responsible for meeting their threat tend to take a short-term view of developments. The short-term view is understandable since those involved in COIN and counterterrorism must in many instances focus on the immediate tactical threat for the stakes are very high.

It is vital that a strategic assessment of future patterns and trends take place. Without it we will find ourselves essentially reacting to short-term contingencies instead of taking the initiative in terms of long-term development. One should not ignore the continuity that marks much of the history of terrorism; but given its rapid developments, it perhaps is even more important to engage strategic intelligence. The emphasis in this chapter, therefore, will not be on continuity but on change. It will summarize and elaborate on a number of the points that arose in the earlier chapters and also address future developments that have not been covered in this monograph.

Fighting in a Multidimensional Battlefield, the Challenges of Linkages

It remains exceedingly difficult for those who seek to counter global insurgency and global terrorism to move beyond the geographic and legal constraints that continue to act as an impediment to the required unity of action and flexibility needed to meet a determined and imaginative adversary. Certainly the whole spectrum of existing insurgencies presented by Bard O'Neill will continue. Some of them, by their own, will not only continue but may increase as the reaction against globalization grows stronger.

The rejection of secularism and modernization will still act as a motivation for various insurgents. Confronted with pressures for homogeneity in an expanding mass society, those who want to maintain or create their identity will call for self-determination — subnationally and transnationally.

As Bard E. O'Neill notes: "Without question, traditional insurgents who articulate primordial and sacred values rooted in ancestral ties and religion have posed the greatest threat in the early 21st century."⁴⁷ This threat will continue and be enhanced through the use of narratives that will affirm or create the call to recognize the unique identity of various groups based on their own reading of history.

The other types of insurgencies will also continue, but *commercialist* insurgency has the potential of becoming increasingly significant:

Commercial insurgents have a narrow tribal or clan basis and are led by self-styled chiefs, war lords, and the like. Their main aim appears to be nothing more than the acquisition of material resources through the seizure and control of political power. Essentially, they consider political legitimacy to be relatively unimportant. Coercive power is what counts.⁴⁸

The growth of this type of insurgency is a manifestation of a number of factors noted earlier in this work. The political goals that have fuelled ideologies have been diminished in the face of apolitical insurgents and terrorists who are motivated by profit. Also many governments have very low legitimacy and the absence of any legitimacy in the gray areas, "the areas of ungovernability where nobody rules."⁴⁹ In other areas, nonstate armed groups are "privatizing public violence," further eroding the legitimacy of states.⁵⁰

What is particularly significant, however, is the recognition that while these different insurgent groups may act on their own, they have and will increasingly establish both intrastate and international linkages with other secessionist movements. In effect they will establish marriages of conveniences. Now having the capability to coordinate their efforts — to achieve their goals through the use of the Internet and other forms of modern communication, these various broadly defined insurgents are literally creating a global enterprise. With different branches and affiliates, the enterprise is acting both independently and in concert to pursue their respective goals. Like such modern terrorist organizations who have effectively used the Internet, most notably Al Qaeda, these groups are establishing a franchise of violence, insurgency, and criminality that can appeal to a broad sector of what can be called illegal entrepreneurs.

These growing linkages will further erode the line between domestic and international insurgency and terrorism. While, as noted earlier, all acts of

terrorism are *local*, the process by which acts of terrorism and how insurgencies will be planned and conducted no longer have a limited theater of operations. Jihadists, for example, are now still differentiating between the *near* regional and *far* enemies (the West and particularly the United States). That differentiation will be transformed because the battlefield will expand far beyond a traditional field of operations. This expansion is certainly to a degree not new since revolutionary movements have sought to export their movement regionally and globally. What has become a reality, however, is the erosion of borders, the lessening of the outward independence of the nation state, the existence of nonstate actors, and the impact of modern technology, the global geographical, and cyber battlefield.

We no longer need a specific base of operations, a centralized command structure, and a unifying ideology that places constraints on what exactly is the battlefield. It is as Brian Jenkins said many years ago: “warfare without territory.”⁵¹ In this environment, traditional military doctrine will have to adjust to meet new realities. For example, “what would be the *center* of the center of gravity” (as postulated by Clausewitz) where we have an international field of operations rather than a specific government in a specific area?

The New Functional Insurgent Threats, Beyond Geographical Considerations

In this blurring of geographical, legal, national, and international boundaries, insurgent threats, tactics, and strategies will have to be assessed on the basis of their international, psychosocial impact. One must therefore go beyond a traditional regional or country threat assessment to match the future intentions and operational capabilities of the global insurgent.

Future global insurgency will include acts of global terrorism. A number of them will be short term and tactical in nature. Others will be part of a strategic campaign, while others will be a combination of both in the pursuit of a global insurgency. As in the case of traditional territorially based insurgencies, insurgent strategies and tactics will go through various phases, although we will still have adversaries who will subscribe to Che Guevara’s approach of the *foci* — whereby protracted campaigns are not necessarily needed to mobilize the mass. The former approach will not take place in a neat, linear order, nor will it necessarily have the phases often cited in the past insurgencies. They will have a combination of the old and new, reflecting the changes in their greatly enhanced capabilities.

Global insurgents who are involved in protracted international campaigns will increasingly be preparing the battlefield, but not necessarily initially to organize superior clandestine and highly disciplined organizations. Rather, they will increasingly use the Internet as follows:

- a. Create virtual events or manipulate real events to develop a favorable awareness and sympathy to their cause.
- b. Circulate propaganda to recruit not only supporters but more importantly, those who will join future organizations as active insurgents.

They will be committed to use violence as a tactic and part of a larger strategy. It is here where David Kilcullen's strategy of disaggregation may help to disrupt and break up short- and long-term attempts to prepare the terrorists in the international battlefield:

... victory does not demand that we pacify every insurgent theatre from the Philippines to Chechnya. It only demands that we identify, and neutralize, those elements in each theatre that link to the global jihad. For example, Chechen separatism predates the involvement of Islamist in the Caucasus. Disaggregation does not demand an immediate resolution to the Chechen insurgency; rather, it demands that we deny the Chechen jihad its links to the global movement and then support Russia in addressing Chechen separatism. Similarly, disaggregation does not demand that we resolve the centuries-old Moro separatist issue in the Philippines. It only requires that we marginalize groups like the Abu Sayyaf group that link into the global jihad and help the Philippines resolve its conflict with groups like the Moro National Liberation Front, who — although Islamic separatist — are seeking regional self government, not endless global jihad.⁵²

It may be difficult to identify and differentiate those who are acting as part of a coordinated global campaign and those who will act individually or with a small group as a result of their own self radicalization. In either case, they will pose a real threat — especially those educated in modern applied technologies, those with highly destructive skills. Moreover, the use of information warfare as an organizational, recruiting and propaganda weapon serves to underscore the traditional counterinsurgent methods directed at the identification, infiltration, and neutralization of insurgent

groups. Selected electronic “targeted assassinations” of Web sites may replace physical attacks on people.

For the short term on a global scope, one can anticipate the attempt to engage in terrorism spectacles like the events of 9/11. Such attacks will particularly seek iconic structures, but in the future, the geographic scope will be far wider including mega structures that are now part of the Asian and Middle Eastern landscape. As before, the initial attacks will be used to dramatize a cause, instill fear in a mass population, create economic chaos, and seek to cause the government to appear powerless or overreacting to an incident. But now one can anticipate a series of coordinated high-profile attacks that will be part of a global insurgent strategy, which will more fundamentally seek to destabilize an already tense international order. If and when these attacks take place, neither states nor nonstate actors may take direct credit. They may use the technique of plausible deniability to mask their involvement and therefore avoid the danger of direct and massive reaction by the targeted victim. The mode of the attack will nevertheless send a clear message that a global insurgency is being conducted by dedicated and in many instances, skillful parties.

What will be perhaps less dramatic but psychologically even more powerful against the targeted audience will be the continuation of less spectacular attacks. These attacks may seem to be contemporary protracted warfare — that is, to erode the will of a population to fight or discredit the capability and confidence in the government to effectively defeat the global insurgents. In the past the ambushes, attacks on government buildings, and ultimately indiscriminate attacks to generate fear were major weapons of terrorism used by insurgents. Now with the type of media coverage available, ironically more selective targeting may enhance the psychological goals of the insurgents. It is one thing to kill village officials or villagers in a rural hamlet; it is another to initiate campaigns of insurgent terrorism at major shopping centers in urban, suburban, and even rural areas, especially if it is simultaneously conducted in a series of attacks over four months on three continents. For in all, the media coverage and the availability of privately owned cell phones and cameras would readily and almost instantaneously disseminate the images of the carnage. In all probability these will be images without any context — out to the public. The message would be clear: no one is safe, and the economic cost could be incalculable.

Although lacking the immediate emotional impact of the spectacular or the recurrent shock created by a campaign of insurgent terrorism, incidents in places where the public meets as a matter of course will be another form of attack. These are the stealth attacks, which can have a profound impact internationally on governments as well as the citizens they are supposed to protect. Such attacks can gradually erode the credibility of a government and loose public support if government can neither identify nor respond until the damage already has been done. It is here where the *techno-guerilla* has a new and growing capability to locally engage in insurgency in a particularly insidious fashion. Such attacks may be the modern equivalent of “the death of one thousand cuts” or the lobster finally dying after the water is slowly heated up instead of being immersed in boiling water.

This gradual erosion of both confidence and security can take many forms. Sophisticated insurgents armed with computer skills could strike on an unpredictable basis with increasingly negative results aimed at disrupting the soft underbellies of post-industrial service-oriented societies. The danger of computer attacks is now recognized, but it is questionable whether governments are prepared to prevent, much less counter, skilled adversaries who challenge the vital services in the financial sector and degrade the capabilities of local governments to provide necessary services. This gradual erosion might in all probability create more of a loss of confidence of the authorities; the public and the government might not realize the disruption over a period was intentional.⁵³

A modification of the stealth approach has already been used. In contrast to the earlier period when terrorist groups would almost immediately take credit during or after an attack, now a number of groups remain silent. In part it may be because they feel the publicity of the act itself has sufficient influence on the public. In part it may be because they do not care about public opinion, but more than likely is the fact that they do not wish to become targets of increasingly more effective counterterrorist operations. This lack of public disclosure of their acts will, in all probability, increase as terrorists inspired to act primarily for profit seek to engage in “quiet extortion” with the demands only known by the respective target, be it a corporation, a nongovernmental organization, or other targets. Criminalization, not politicalization, will enhance the temptation to avoid publicity and open notoriety.

As noted earlier, virtual insurgency and terrorism on a global basis will increasingly be a weapon of choice, as compared to stealth operations, since attacks would be a form of what could be called meta-stealth operations. Classic techniques of disinformation and deception will now be greatly enhanced visually through the eye of the camera and the medium of cyberspace and the myriad, often conflicting images and information on the Internet. Global insurgents will not only create their own narratives but

Classic techniques of disinformation and deception will now be greatly enhanced visually through the eye of the camera and the medium of cyberspace...

also alter perception even before “purported” acts or campaigns of violence. The so called “war in the shadows” may not be a war per se, but just the shadows used by skillful adversaries who will have the ability to modify reality to achieve their goals. This threat will be one of the most demanding challenges that security officials — both governmental and private sectors on the local, national, regional, and global level — will be confronted with in the coming years.

A current major concern will be the danger that terrorists will use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as part of their arsenal. Despite the efforts of nuclear nonproliferation, this concern will increase over the years as chemical and biological weapons will remain easy to obtain or create. The level of technological sophistication will only be enhanced by a new generation of terrorist’s schools in the latest techniques of man-made destruction. Given the technical challenges and increased security, one can hope that the nuclear scenario will not occur, but the reality of other WMD being used raises the question of not whether it will happen but when it will happen.

The question of WMD use may have to be placed in another context — that is, those who use terrorism as part of a global insurgency and those who are geographically limited in their goals and possible capabilities. One can suggest that the global insurgent may seek to use a wide variety of lower level WMD threats and possible actions in the form of chemical and biological weapons, which of course in their own right could create mass casualties. Their willingness to engage in very large mass casualty events might be limited, however, particularly using nuclear devices. This limitation may be because, as noted earlier, these global insurgents are engaging in a protracted

conflict that seeks to discredit the government's ability to protect its population and erode the will of the public to maintain a resolve against terrorist acts and campaigns. The global insurgents may not wish to engage in such a massive action, which would create the type of unity of action internationally that is needed to combat terrorism. In a sense these insurgents would be concerned about public opinion. Unfortunately the same cannot be said for the suicide bomber that could be called the transcendental terrorist, as others motivated by their faith see the realization of their goals in the literal destruction of the existing system. Unfortunately the WMD suicide bomber may seek to carry out his form of martyrdom operations individually, as part of a small group, or a larger organization.

What is also important in regard to future developments is again the role of perception. Even if a state does not yet have the capability to make and stockpile weapons, the potential gives them a form of international linkage or more candidly, nuclear-blackmail negotiations. Certainly Iran fits in that category, and North Korea prior to exploding its devices maximized its international role as a major threat and player in the international order, despite the fact that for all intents and purposes it is an international basket case — a country characterized by coercion, starvation, and a nonfunctioning economy. One must therefore raise the following question: Will the global insurgents effectively enhance their capacity to engage in international intimidation, not because they have WMD but because they will increasingly be able to create and manipulate the threat through cyberspace? Even if the weapons are not there, the nuclear threat in particular will be used in all probability not only for political leverage but for mass psychological intimidation.

Hybrid Warfare and Beyond, the Big Picture

In the final analysis, as noted throughout this monograph, the development and future evolution of global insurgency and global terrorism are major manifestations of broader changes. Specifically the changes are in international politics, the nature of armed conflict, and that type of structured conflict known as warfare — conventional and unconventional. The current popular term, *hybrid* warfare or conflict captures to a degree the changes we are now witnessing.

Hybrid conflicts ... are full spectrum wars with both physical and conceptual dimensions: the former, a struggle against an armed enemy and the latter, a wider struggle for control and support of the combat zone's indigenous population. The support of the home fronts of intervening nations and the support of the international community ... to secure and stabilize the indigenous population, the intervening forces must immediately rebuild or restore essential services, local government, self-defense forces, and essential elements of the economy.⁵⁴

While this definition is still to a large degree territorially based — that is, uses the term *combat zone* and refers to the *indigenous population* within, it does broaden out to focus on the “support of the international community,” which is essential in defeating global insurgency. Nevertheless the term as used here appears to be placing the emphasis on traditional requirements for internal defense and development (IDAD) directed at strengthening an endangered government rather than placing the type of emphasis needed when confronted with global insurgency and global terrorism.

The following definition more aptly identifies the participants in a hybrid war and its internationalization and the need for fresh approaches:

Diverse actors, especially nonstate actors, frequently operating covertly or as proxies for states, not bound by internationally recognized norms of behavior and resistant to traditional means of deterrence, will be difficult to discern and will shift their alliances and approaches over time to avoid our strengths. Hybrid threats — diverse, dynamic combinations of conventional, irregular, terrorist, and criminal capabilities — will make pursuit of singular approaches difficult, necessitating innovative, hybrid solutions including new combinations of national power.⁵⁵

This definition also aptly covered not only the diverse threat and participants but the challenges created by the shifting alliances of the marriages of convenience noted throughout this monograph. Remarkably General James N. Mattis, then commander of Joint Forces Command noted in 2009 that there is a “need for the U.S. military to transform to a ‘hybrid’ force that expands its nonconventional means without sacrificing classic warfighting competence.”⁵⁶ The question is, Can one expand a conventional force to meet

the unique mission requirements of SOF? Can in a sense, one size fit all? The dangers noted earlier of seeking to conventionalize the SOF community or expanding its mission too broadly can be seen in this definition.

While the term *hybrid war* does have a meaningful analytical and doctrinal place in addressing the changing nature of conflict, it is still primarily based in an identifiable and territorially defined field of operations. Moreover it is understandable that its emphasis is in warfighting the key roles of other types of activities that need to be integrated into the hybrid approach, particularly in regards to the key role of information warfare. It is just that the need to change both narratives through skillful techniques of perceptual change should be addressed.

Chapter 2 indicated that the military should not think out of the box — that is, not be in the box in the first place. Secretary of Defense Gates reinforced that concern when he delivered a speech at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College:

You must develop the analysis, doctrine, and strategy and tactics needed for success in 21st century conflicts... You must continue to be visionaries, the pathfinders, and the intellectual cutting edge of the army.⁵⁷

Civilian and military leaders in all of the services as well as senior policymakers involved in the complexities of national security should heed his advice.

Conclusion

The remarkable and fast-paced changes in addressing the changing nature of hybrid war underscore a need for creativity and imagination in the arts and sciences of politics and warfare. We always have lessons to be learned from the past, but it is now more important than ever to anticipate changes that may lead to discontinuity with the past. New lessons will have to be learned as the reality of global insurgency and terrorism continue to evolve.

8. Countering Global Insurgency, New Challenges and Approaches

It is difficult to identify new trends, particularly in the inherently complex worlds of globalization, conflict environments, the changing nature of warfare, and ultimately the emergence of global insurgency and global terrorism. Suggesting different approaches for dealing with the topic of global insurgency is probably more difficult. Even if we agreed on its existence and development, we have no body of knowledge that specifically addresses a changing form of conflict although it comes from a rich historical legacy. The situation is further complicated because the threat is evolving. It is not only difficult to discuss continuity but even more difficult to address change in what is an intellectual, analytical, and ultimately an operational moving target. Like acts and campaigns of violence in its many forms, global insurgency has its own dynamics that do not necessarily provide past patterns. If patterns existed, they could be used to offer alternative responses to present and future threats — especially when technological changes have created a considerable discontinuity with the past. Despite the exhaustive literature on insurgency, the nagging problem is how many lessons can be learned from past experience and would we listen to such lessons. Given our past experience as it relates to both insurgency and terrorism, one cannot wonder whether bureaucracies — with their emphasis on tradition, incrementalism, or conventionality — suffer from a form of organizational Alzheimer's disease where one is incapable of learning from the past and incapable of looking to the future.

Presenting an Overview, the Need for Clarity and Simplicity

This chapter provides an exposition of the approaches and associated policies and strategies that need to be refined and reformulated to meet the future challenges created by global insurgency. One hopes that this conclusion will provide not only a summary of the major areas discussed in this paper but also the basis for discussions for those who wish to understand terrorism. More importantly, these ideas may help those who must prepare to take the initiative and respond to what is in effect an ongoing transformation of insurgency and terrorism.

Avoiding the Intellectual, Organizational, and Operational Constraints Created by the Tyranny of Territoriality

The incredible pace of technological innovation has enabled us to develop our capabilities for exploring outer space. It has also enabled us to refine our abilities for exploring the use of outer space. Yet despite these advancements, one sometimes wonders if we are still involved in the type of mentality that General Billy Mitchell fought as a proponent of airpower. He spoke of the traditional military and civilian traditionalists who were firmly embedded on the land and the sea. The capability is there and the technology is advancing, yet despite recognition of the importance of the aerospace, organizationally and intellectually, we still find our comfort zone in territorially based conflicts — whether they are regional or in individual countries. Ultimately when an attack takes place it will have its major impact on the land, and the immediate direct victims may essentially be local in nature.

At this time terrorists are increasingly effective using the mediums of aerospace and cyberspace to carry out their missions. In a real sense they are practicing a form of low-intensity aerospace warfare. Yet it is especially ironic that often those modern insurgents justify their actions on the real or imaginary community, based especially on a narrative that makes a geographical area sacred to their cause. At the same time they have used technology to transcend territory starting with the early skyjackings, now the man-directed guided missiles, in the form of aircraft as horribly “perfected” and executed as in the events of 9/11. Moreover, the insurgents of today are integrating their abilities through modern technological innovations via transportation in aerospace and now in another dimension with the ability to launch their assaults in cyberspace while simultaneously relating these nonterritorial capabilities to their new targets in a global insurgency.

The suggestion is not that the insurgents will ultimately achieve their goals or strategic visions but rather the potential protectors or the victims will learn to move beyond the tyranny of territoriality. Otherwise, the insurgents will increasingly inflict not only great physical harm on societies but also erode the credibility of governments whose legitimacy is already questionable. Even governments that by history and tradition are adjudged by their populations to be legitimate run the risk of overreacting. At the same time, the public — who may demand security over the most fundamental values of democratic societies — may discredit their government. And traditional societies, who in their own right are attempting to maintain their values

in the face of modernization, face a similar challenge. Given the reality of the tyranny associated with territoriality, it will take a complete change for governments and the public to adjust and take the initiative from a new generation of insurgents and terrorists.

In order to meet these challenges, major changes must occur in what can be called a global COIN. On the national level, the effort does not yet need another reorganization, which often not only adds complexity but yet another layer of bureaucracy and competition. Nor does reform call for reorganization within the military, who must be involved in what is now called hybrid war. It must also meet the imperatives of the changing nature of conflict, both territorially and nonterritorially.

The key is to develop the required openness and flexibility, which involves employing existing bureaucratic structures (rather than creating new ones) to adjust to the need for globalized operations. The approach requires more than the necessary fusion of counterinsurgent and counterterrorism intelligence. It requires a clear direction from the senior leadership of that fusion, and is only effective if it is disseminated as actionable intelligence. The attack at Fort Hood, the almost successful aircraft bombing on Christmas day 2009, and other near misses serve to underscore that unless we can move beyond fighting in bureaucratic, not geographic “turf battles,” the best intelligence will not be put to use. A unity of purpose and action is absolutely vital in combating insurgencies, global and local, and will not be achieved until the intelligence community acts as one with common goals and united action.

This requirement also moves beyond the accompanying call for further reform through the use of an integrated approach. All too often, especially in the past experiences with the evolution of counterterrorism structures and policy, integration was largely the result of bureaucratic compromises, not on the basis of achieving the necessary unity to counter the threat. What is therefore needed is a holistic approach that goes beyond fusion and integration, where irrespective of the existing organizational structure, sharing of information occurs at all levels. In pursuing this approach, the understandable need for classification and protection of sensitive sources should not be used as a justification for, or act as a barrier to, disseminating information.

Global insurgents have recognized this need to achieve a degree of unity despite the diversity of their organizations. By necessity they are collecting intelligence from the local to the international level in the pursuit of their long-term goals. They do not suffer from bureaucratic complexity

and competition. For the United States, the need for a holistic approach is reinforced by the ability of the insurgent terrorists to find recruits nationally and have them act internationally.

In this time of seamless terrorism, the days when domestic and international terrorism could be readily differentiated have passed. The necessary approach goes beyond maximizing the crucial role of intelligence for penetrating the goals and operational capabilities and intention of the insurgents. It requires an ability to develop a genuine recognition that those involved in global terrorism should in a sense sit at a round table, where no one group is recognized as being more important than another. In the United States, despite the development of counterterrorism task forces and the integration of federal, state, and local participation in operations, the dissemination of information to the state and the local level is still essentially subordinated to the priorities of federal law enforcement agencies. Exceptions of course occur; given the events of 9/11, the New York Police Department has certainly developed its own very impressive counterterrorism organization both in regards to intelligence and operations. Yet time after time it has become readily clear that global insurgent terrorists are more vulnerable when they seek to conduct their operations at a specific location. It will be the local and state agencies that with proper support act most capably within their own area.

We also have a vital need for coordination “in country” and internationally between police, military forces, the State Department, and intelligence agencies. The coordination would lessen the ability of international insurgents to draw on support and recruitment of those involved in localized territorially based insurgencies. Effective coordination — however demanding — can help break the ties that enable the insurgent and terrorist to globalize the conflict.

Finally the requirement for greater regional and international cooperation is essential. On the positive side, a growing network of experts are sharing information both informally and formally laterally. Such a development should be encouraged because despite competing national interests, shared values protect one’s own citizens from terrorism.

Conclusion

While we have no simple solutions for combating global insurgency and global terrorism, we need to recognize that unnecessary duplication in the

form of complex organizations and attendant planning can act as an impediment to combat those involved in a global conflict. It is far easier to create a complex organization than to develop one that is highly effective in action.

9. The Dimensions of Policy, the Challenge Continues

The necessary changes to counter global insurgency will not be effective if they are not grounded on the policies that serve as a guide to defeating a continuing and growing threat. The short-run prognosis of the formulation and execution of the necessary policies is not good. The continued political and military instability and violence in Iraq and the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan underscores the need for a reevaluation of American policy. This reevaluation should extend to the region at large. Unless there is a meaningful bipartisan consensus, one can expect the withdrawal of United States forces from both embattled countries. What will be the result is open to debate. In Iraq the ethnic and religious divide may widen, but the evolution of a political process is possible; it will provide a degree of security and political accommodation that can lead to a manageable level of strife. (One must note, however, the term *manageable* is subjective and has little meaning to the victims and their families.)

In Afghanistan the problems of wholesale corruption fueled by the drug trade, the continued power of the war lords, and the continued assertion of the Taliban and other groups makes one question in what direction that country is going. Indeed, a recent field study finds that the Taliban is becoming much like Colombia's FARC wherein ideology has given way to the insurgent business of narcotrafficking, kidnapping, extortion, and the like.⁵⁸ Despite all we have learned, those civilians and military involved in the conduct of foreign relations and national security will still face challenges when dealing with territorial and now especially nonterritorial global insurgency. In contrast the insurgents of today have used the impact of globalization, the adherence of traditional beliefs, ethnic identity, and the power of the Internet to recruit, organize, and field highly dedicated insurgents with the ability to maximize their impact despite their size or weapons. It is unclear where these struggles will lead us, but the dangers of short- and long-term failures in addressing these challenges must be a focus of analysis and action.

The vital concern of addressing key policy issues associated with current conflicts does not absolve the policymaker from anticipating the emergence of new threats. Unless the evolving nature of the global insurgency threat

is recognized and acted upon, the U.S. will be thinking territorially in a globalized world. That threat has already become a reality and will in all likelihood increase, irrespective of the current conflicts. Indeed, one could add that if some level of stability and order returned to Iraq and finally became a reality in Afghanistan, the insurgents using the indirect approach would expand their already growing field of operations to the far enemies and even broader global arena. “He who knows the art of the direct and the indirect approach will be victorious,” Sun Tzu advises.⁵⁹

A Summary of Points of Policy Guidance

This section gives five major considerations that should be addressed in countering global insurgency. They of course are not exhaustive or presented in detail. However, the points are for those who must move ahead and look beyond the current challenges to address the growing threat of global insurgency.

While territorially based insurgencies, regional strife, and conventional wars will continue, policymakers must extend their thinking to deal with what could be regarded as the four dimensions of global insurgency: land, sea, air, and cyberspace. They must take a holistic approach in addressing a threat that no longer operates in one major medium. It will be vital that policymakers formulate not only integrated but holistic policies, which will enable them to prepare for short-, medium-, and long-term challenges by global insurgents. This multidimensional threat by these insurgents will continue to have economic, political, and social objectives. First and foremost, however, policymakers must recognize that the media in which these threats are emerging are changing and therefore the strategies, tactics, and capabilities of the insurgents and terrorists are also undergoing transformation. Conceptually policymakers face the daunting challenge of adjusting their policies, much like those who preceded them had to move beyond the debate over air power.

Broaden the scope and direction of policy. Recognizing that the primacy of the state is increasingly being eroded by other participants in international politics, policymakers will need to broaden the scope and direction of their policy. In regard to scope, they must increasingly think in terms of international interdependence. While the importance of territorial expertise and operational capabilities will of course continue to be required, policymakers

require a broader vision. Such a vision will include far more international cooperation. While such cooperation in regards to international terrorism has improved, the pace of cooperation has not kept up. Counterterrorism policy innovations will probably be incremental until public pressure resulting from campaigns of terrorism by global insurgents increase in Europe, the United States, Japan, and other post-industrial societies.

It is vital that the international community take the initiative and engage in a coordinated global COIN/terrorism offensive. Neither the United States nor other target countries want to position themselves so they merely react after the damage has been done. In order to be proactive, international cooperation must include in an integrated manner a wide variety of nonstate actors ranging from responsible private and corporate security forces to nongovernmental organizations whose specialization must be recognized and whose service go beyond what they often regard to be the parochial interest of nation states.

Seek common ground and respect via leaders in the diverse Islamic community. The battle for ideas and values should play an important part in formulating and executing policies to counter global insurgency. This battle cannot be directed at a single overarching ideology, as was the case in the Cold War. While many agree that jihadists are engaging in a global insurgency, we must not characterize Islam based on those who use its tenets to motivate or justify acts of terrorism as part of a global strategy. Rather, the United States and its allies should recognize that Islam is not monolithic — that is, while it has shared values, interpretations differ based on region and sect. Moreover, many of the encompassing beliefs are the same or very similar to the world's other major religions.

Policymakers would therefore be well advised to not approach the religion as caricature but seek common ground and respect through leaders in the diverse Islamic community. Islam, as in the case of other religions, is now being subject to its own transformation in its adjustment to globalization and modernization. Mutual respect may help break the mistrust among civilizations. The insurgents may share a proto-ideology but not a cohesive core of beliefs shared by a homogenous religion.

By avoiding the rhetoric of conflict, common ground can be established with those in Islam who do not subscribe to violence. It is everyone's interest to markedly reduce the protracted and deadly violence of the extremist,

and we have fundamental human rights that are universally recognized and should be shared. This recognition must again be reconciled with the values associated with traditional societies and their governments. Fundamental questions of conducting relations with authoritarian governments continue, but in the final analysis, any meaningful change must primarily come from within them. Strong actions against such regimes can only be justified if they do indeed represent a threat to the United States.

Place terrorism education in a broader context. Perhaps one of the greatest shortfalls in both U.S. and international policies associated with countering terrorism and global insurgency is the failure to fully recognize the importance of terrorism education. It is needed for the public in all its forms and at all levels. Terrorism has been effective because it plays on fears that the media and Internet magnify. While the threat is real, it needs to be placed in perspective. The goals of the terrorist need to be carefully spelled out; focus on the basic elements of the threat rather than move into the morass of definition. If the public understands that it is the goal of terrorists to spread fear and panic, engage in intimidation, and degrade public confidence in government, the shock of the next incident will not be as intense. It is the unknown or misunderstood that magnifies the fears of an individual or entire nation.

Terrorists by their actions seek to create division in response to their acts based on stereotyping, religious division, and political fault lines. Until now, public education, where it has taken place, primarily deals with being aware of a threat environment and preparing to take the appropriate action after an attack takes place. It is now crucial to place education in a far broader context. Such a context will not immunize the public to threats and acts but will help them cope. Policymakers should draw upon the experience of countries that have had to deal with terrorism on an ongoing basis; expand concepts beyond personal security and crisis management. The precedence for public education is there — for example, the fight against smoking, AIDS, and other diseases provides a potential public health education model. Because terrorism associated with territorial and global insurgencies are most assuredly threats to the public's health, its education is important.

Engage in an effective long-term strategic assessment of the conflict environment. The military places heavy emphasis on *preparing the battlefield*, yet often not also policy making. The *battlefield* is not primarily where the

conflict is in place but rather on the home front. It is the battle for favorable public opinion. The ability of administrations to mobilize the public, in the short run, regarding drastic attacks — be they Pearl Harbor or 9/11 — is readily apparent. Such historic assaults have also justified the application of massive support as Operation Iraqi Freedom attested. Whether it was the United States involvement in Iraq or Afghanistan, policymakers guided by immediate events; they often followed those counterparts in the intelligence community and the military who did not engage in an effective long-term strategic assessment of the conflict environment.

Today we enjoy the advantage of hindsight — that is, do not feel the pressures of the public's clamor for immediate action as was the case with 9/11. A longer view must be taken, however, as we witness the evolution of a global insurgency. In such a conflict, clear-cut attacks can mobilize domestic support to take massive action. But such support in the international arena is questionable where different national interests act as an impediment for the sharing of a common concern. Also issues of sovereignty act as legal and operational barriers to concerted effort even if a shared view says that mutual security might be threatened. As a result — both domestically and internationally, it is difficult to acquire popular support for a global conflict that is yet to be fully recognized. It remains a difficult task to achieve a unity of action within the United States, much less with allies in a chaotic international environment.

About domestic public opinion, policymakers must focus on clearly enunciating that the line between domestic and foreign terrorism has been blurred. Clarify that nonterritorial terrorists acting independently or as global insurgents increasingly have the ability to engage in both overt and covert attacks; in addition, the damage may not be fully recognized until after the attack has been underway. It is not enough to theorize about the long-term emerging threats or simply label them. Policymakers face the onerous task of engaging in those measures that seek some level of cooperation. The focus is with people and governments in zones of conflict that feed the motivation and recruitment of those who, in a very real sense, declared war against all. This message must be conveyed internationally with the recognition that the United States is a partner in an evolving global conflict. The United States can no longer do it alone.

Integrate knowledge and technology. In the effort to meet the challenge of global conflict, we have no magic bullets. Beyond developing unified policy and action, we need an integration of knowledge and technology that can adjust to and take the initiative in the complex environment of global insurgency. One wishes for a modern day “Manhattan Project” to meet the demands of the changing conflict environment, but the environment is so diffuse that it is hardly conducive to a singular technological breakthrough. This aspect is true even though we still place such a heavy response on high technology in a low technology war. Nevertheless, despite the challenge, a coordinated effort must occur in the United States and internationally — that is, combine our knowledge of the “hard” and social sciences with the liberal arts to more fully understand the nature of global change, not in the context of a particular discipline but as an integrated effort.

Policymakers, with all their other responsibilities must encourage and support such an effort both domestically and internationally. Such is the case with leaders in education who grapple with a changing educational environment created by technology, which requires that universities be boldly innovative. A cadre of individuals knowledgeable of the history of an area, its language, and culture and trained in the technology of modern communication will be as important as the most skillful counterinsurgent. And the counterinsurgent who is educated like his civilian counterpart will also be equal to the task of becoming part of an in effective COIN cadre.

Conclusion

Particularly for those in the special operations community — the major readership for this monograph, the added burden is ensuring that military education instills an appreciation of the changing nature of conflict in our chaotic, complex environment. In the blurred areas between war and peace, domestic and international terrorism, global and territorial insurgency, we will also have requirements for the traditional skills and values of waging armed conflict that must be constantly adjusted to meet new realities. ↑

Endnotes

Many of the citations are of works in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. These citations underscore the fact that the nature of contemporary insurgency and terrorism has evolved over time. Our understanding of terrorism particularly grew before it became a concern to policymakers and academics. The citations especially illustrate that one did not have to have a torrent of varying quality papers, which came with the advent of the Internet, to ascertain crucial future patterns related to the emergence of global insurgency and global terrorism. Respect is extended to those pioneers whose studies were based on their interests and forward-looking views rather than the subject being topical and *hot*, either on the beltway, academia, or the media.

1. Arthur C. Clark was a science fiction writer, author of *2001: A Space Odyssey*.
2. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso Books, 1991).
3. Maurice A. East et al., eds., "The International System Perspective on Foreign Policy," *Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Foreign Policy* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publishers, 1978), p. 145.
4. Rupert Emerson, *From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African People* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 95-96. For a discussion of the impact of globalization on tribalism, see Benjamin Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld, How Globalization and Tribalism are Reshaping the World* (New York: Ballentine Books, 1996).
5. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 4th Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), p. 97.
6. Charles A. Russell and Bowman H. Miller, "Profile of a Terrorist," *Terrorism: An International Journal* Vol. 1, No. 1 (1977).
7. Claire Sterling, *The Terror Network* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Reader's Digest Press, 1981). One of the most provocative books of the time was written by Claire Sterling who emphasized the connection between Moscow and various terrorist groups. Many analysts disagreed with her findings, but Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) William Casey supported her findings since they affirmed his view of Soviet involvement.
8. Xavier Raufer, "Gray Areas, A New Security Threat," *Political Warfare*, No. 19 (Spring 1992).
9. A term coined by the late John O'Neill who, in his capacity as head of Counterterrorism in the FBI New York Office, warned of the 9/11 attacks. He was killed while chief of Security at the World Trade Center. He was a real visionary who fought the myopia and behavior of the conventional bureaucracy.
10. Stephen Sloan, *The Anatomy of Nonterritorial Terrorism: An Analytical Essay* (Gaithersburg, MD: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1978), p. 3.

11. The term was originated by an Italian extremist Carlos Piscane. For brief comments, see Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Revised and Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 5.
12. Bob Hohler and Adam Pertman, "A Deadly Flight for Fame Lost in a Downward Spiral," *Boston Globe*, 18 September 1994. The pilot had a severe substance abuse problem. Because of his personal and business problems, he decided to commit suicide. While he was not motivated by terrorism, the danger of future — much larger — suicide attacks by terrorists should have been clear for those who cared to analyze the event. Had the plane not been stopped by a tree and foliage, it probably could have hit the President's quarters. A later attack via a plane flying from a general aviation field took place when Andrew Joseph Stack, who had problems with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), crashed into its Austin office. "Man Crashes Plane into IRS Office," *New York Times*, 18 February 2010.

Despite improvements — especially since 9/11, serious questions remain regarding security in general aviation as contrasted to schedule airlines. Despite the fact that such airports handle a growing number of long-range executive jets and an expanding fleet of air taxis, they remain softer targets than their larger counterparts. A concern over this gap in security was recognized a number of years ago and continues today. See Harry Pizer and Stephen Sloan, *Corporate Aviation Security: The Next Generation in Aerospace Operations* (Norman, OK, University of Oklahoma Press, 1992). Other incidents occurred, including one where a teenager broke into an executive jet and went for a joy ride. What will it take to have this gap closed?

13. Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), p. 2.
14. Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1976), p. 89. Clausewitz describes *trinitarian* war as a paradoxical trinity composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; chance and probability, within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and its element of subordination as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason. In short, these aspects of war are the people, the army, and the government — a model that influences counterinsurgency doctrine today.
15. Van Creveld, p. 58.
16. Professor Felix Gross at New York University wrote one of the most farsighted and early studies of identifying and classifying areas of potential and actual strife. His analysis is still pertinent today. Felix Gross, *World Politics and Tensions Areas* (New York: New York University Press, 1966).
17. John O'Neill as previously acknowledged.
18. Stephen Sloan, *Terrorism: The Present Threat in Context* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2006), p. 109. The key aspect of perception is closely related to the emergence of netwar and the battle in cyberspace.

For an excellent collection of articles on the topic, see John Arquilla and David Ronfeld, eds., *Networks and Netwar: the Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2001).

19. From a movie based on the play *The Scarlet Pimpernel*, originally written by Baroness Emmuska Orczy in 1903.
20. "Insurgency," *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02, 12 April 2001, amended through 30 September 2010, p. 229.
21. United States Department of the Army, *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, with forewords by General David H. Petraeus, Lieutenant General James F. Amos, and Lieutenant Colonel John A. Nagel and a new introduction by Sarah Sewall (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 2; original text of U.S. Army FM 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, first issued on 15 December 2006.
22. Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, Revised 2nd Edition (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005), p. 15. This edition is the latest version of the contemporary classics that systematically addressed the nature and strategies associated with insurgency and terrorism and the types of responses needed to counter them. The author addressed the relationship between terrorism as it related to essentially territorially based insurgencies.
23. O'Neal, pp. 25-28. The author's classification of different types of insurgencies provides a basis for comparative analysis.
24. Clausewitz, p. 87. Specifically, Clausewitz advises:

What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means. War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means. That...is no small demand.

The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and the means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.
25. See Donald Vought, "American Culture and American Arms: The Case of Viet Nam," in *Lessons from an Unconventional War*, eds. Richard A. Hunt and Richard A. Shultz, Jr. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982).
26. Adda B. Bozeman, *Strategic Intelligence & Statecraft: Selected Essays* (Washington D.C.: Brassey's Intelligence and National Security Library, 1992), p. 2. Bozeman had an extraordinary ability to identify major cultural factors that determine both perception and actions of highly diverse people. She also emphasized the key role of strategic intelligence, which is still often given second place to the demands based on the need for short-term tactical intelligence.
27. Bozeman; see Chapter 9, "Strategic Intelligence and Cold War of Ideas," to appreciate how the author places the current concern over the *war of ideas* in a historical context.
28. B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967; Signet Books, 1974), p. 352.

29. For a discussion of the first three points, see Stephen Sloan, "The Changing Face of Insurgency in the Post-Cold War Era: Doctrinal and Operational Implications," in *Saving Democracies: U.S. Intervention in Threatened Democratic States*, ed. Anthony James Joes (Westport, CN: Praeger, 1999).
For an excellent study of the indirect approach, see Thomas H. Henriksen, *Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency and the Indirect Approach*, JSOU Report 10-3 (Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University Press, April 2010), pp. 4-5.
30. For a discussion of *hybrid war*, see Dr. Russell W. Glenn, "Thoughts on 'Hybrid' Conflict," *Military Review* (March-April 2009); available from <http://smallwars-journal.com/blog/2009/03/thoughts-on-hybrid-conflict/>, accessed February 2011.
31. As taken from a videotape interview between the author and Brigadier General Douglas Kinnard for the author's class on intelligence at the University of Oklahoma. General Kinnard's book, *The War Managers: American Generals Reflect on Vietnam* underscores what happens when policies are not clearly enunciated thus not fully comprehended or shared by senior officers of an administration. During interviews with generals who were in command in Vietnam, General Kinnard said a number of them candidly noted that it was unclear why they were there and what their courses of action should be. See *The War Managers* (Cambridge, MA: DaCapo Press, 1991 reprint). One must raise the following question based on the experience of Tet: Would the public have a similar response to a major incident or campaign of terrorism in the United States even if they generally agreed that the war on terrorism was being won? One can also look at the tragic bombing of the Marine Corps temporarily headquarters in Beirut on 23 October 1983 where 241 Marines were killed. As a result, U.S. forces left Lebanon and our policy to the region was changed in regards to that country. The issue of expectation versus resolve will be continually tested regarding future acts of global insurgency and global terrorism
32. *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, p. 1.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 80.
36. Max G. Manwaring, ed., *Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm of Low Intensity Conflict*, (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1991), p. 20.
37. O'Neill, p. 15.
38. *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, p. 60.
39. The concern for developing the appropriate forces to combat terrorism, which also would be applicable for combating global insurgency, is not new but awaits fruition. For a discussion of such a force, see Stephen Sloan, *Beating International Terrorism: An Action Strategy for Preemption and Punishment*, Revised Edition (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, April 2000); the original study was published by the Air University Press in 1986. Particularly, see "The Need to Apply Terrorist Organizational Doctrine to Counter and Preempt Terrorism"

(within Chapter 3), pp. 36-38; available at http://aupress.au.af.mil/digital/pdf/Book/Sloan_Beating_Terrorism.pdf, accessed February 2011.

40. For an extensive treatment of the questions associated with the nature strategies and concepts and an extensive and current dictionary on terrorist groups, leadership, and other material, see Sean K. Anderson with Stephen Sloan, *Historical Dictionary of Terrorism*, Third Edition (Latham MD: Scarecrow Press, 2009.)
41. Walter Laqueur, "Postmodern Terrorism: New Rules for an Old Game," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 75, No. 5 (12 September 1995).
42. Sloan, *Terrorism: The Present Threat in Context*; see Chapter 1, "The Meaning of Terrorism: Cutting Through the Semantic Jungle."
43. This often used quote is from Brian Jenkins. Mr. Jenkins is the pioneer scholar on terrorism in the United States and one of the leading international scholars both on insurgency and terrorism. His *International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict*, Research Paper No. 48, California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy (Los Angeles, CA: Crescent Publishers, 1975), p. 4 sets the foundation for all the studies that followed. Since the 1970s he has not only been a prolific writer and researcher but a major consultant with both domestic and international authorities.
44. The radio show, performed by the radio series *Mercury Theater on the Air* and directed by Orson Welles, was based on H. G. Wells' novel of the same name (*The War of the Worlds*). Because many of the audience did not realize it was play — not an actual news report, it created widespread panic especially on the East Coast where the attack was supposedly taking place.

For a discussion of virtual terrorism and how it can be applied to making threats and acts of terrorism even more complex to governments, counterterrorism forces, and especially the public, see Stephen Sloan and Robert J. Bunker, "Threat Group Dual- Dimensional Cyberspace Operations," in *Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), pp. 130-132.
45. Lieutenant Colonel David Bradford, USAF (Ret.), in an unpublished manuscript he gave to the author.
46. Sun Tzu, "Energy" (Chapter 5) in *The Art of War* (New York: Clarendon Press, 1963; Oxford University Press, 1971) p. 91; available from www.readprint.com/chapter-9749/The-Art-of-War-Sun-Tzu, accessed February 2011.
47. O' Neal, p. 28.
48. Ibid.
49. Xavier Raufer, "Gray Areas: A New Security Threat," *Political Warfare* (Spring 1999).
50. Stephen Sloan, "Technology and Terrorism: Privatizing Public Violence," *IEEE Technology and Society Magazine* Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer 1993).
51. Brian Jenkins, "International; Terrorism: A Balance Sheet," *Survival* Vol. 17, No. 4 (July 1975), p. 160.

52. Lieutenant Colonel David J. Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 214. See Chapter 6, “Countering Global Insurgency” Part 4, “The Strategy of Disaggregation” (which begins on page 212).
53. Norman Hadley, a very prescient author coined the term “techno-guerrilla” in his book, *The Viking Process* (New York: Avon Books, 1977). The plot involved a corporation hiring an early version of “hackers” long before the term was invented to destroy the computers of a rival corporation. Those who are now interested in information and cyber warfare will find this book both entertaining and relevant to understanding current and future threats.
54. Dr. Russell W. Glenn, “Thoughts on ‘Hybrid’ Conflicts.”
55. Army Chief of Staff George W. Casey, Jr., “America’s Army in an Era of Persistent Conflict,” *Army Magazine* Green Book Edition (October 2008), p. 24; available at www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2008/10/Documents/Casey_1008.pdf, accessed February 2011. His remarks were reprinted in “Reflections from Dr. Jack, Hybrid Warfare – The Looming Threat,” *Combined Arms Center Blog*; available from <http://usacac.army.mil/blog/blogs/reflectionsfromfront/archive/2008/11/14/hybrid-warfare-the-looming-threat.aspx>, accessed February 2011.
56. John J. Kruzal, “U.S. Military Must Prepare for Hybrid Warfare, General Says” *Small Wars Journal* (13 February 2009), p. 1; available at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/02/general-mattis-us-must-prepare/>, accessed February 2011.
57. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’s speech at Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 7 May 2010; available at www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1465, accessed February 2011.
58. Gretchen Peters, *Crime and Insurgency in the Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan* (West Point: Combating Terrorism Center, October 2010), p. 91. The study concludes that “Militant groups on either side of the [Afghanistan-Pakistan] frontier function like a broad network of criminal gangs.... [T]he insurgency...appears to be increasingly motivated by profit, [while] ...various hard core elements are still bent on ideological goals...” The Quetta Sura Taliban [in Afghanistan] is increasingly behaving like a drug cartel.
59. Sun Tzu, p. 106.